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I. INTRODUCTION
The Framers of the United States Constitution created a sys-
tem of checks and balances1 applicable to the decision to corn-
1 See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-51 (J. Madison); W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 1-8 (1965); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION
31-35 (1972); A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 60 (1976); Cas-
per, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy: A Nonjudi-
cial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 463, 486-91 (1976). Checks and balances is a means to ensure
the proper maintenance of a separation of powers. W. GwYN, supra, at 3. Pursuant to checks
and balances, each branch is granted some power over the same activity, along with the
constitutional means necessay to avoid interbranch encroachment. THE FEDERALIT, supra,
No. 51, at 355-59 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961). In this manner, the checks-and-bal-
ances system serves to create a safe and effective method for the distribution of power while
avoiding the potential abuse of power. See A. SOFAER, supra, at 60.
At the foundation of this division of power was the Framers' attempt to safeguard the
emergent republic against human fallibility. THE FEDERALIST, supra, No. 70, at 451 (A.
Hamilton); id. No. 31, at 237 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 73, at 468 (A. Hamilton). Above all, the
Framers were concerned that man's ambitious nature would result in an intentional abuse of
power. Indeed, in the words of James Madison: "Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition." Id. No. 51, at 356 (J. Madison).
The Framers originally considered two theories of government: a pure separation of
powers system and a separation of powers as modified by checks and balances. A. SOFAER,
supra, at 60. In adopting the latter theory, the Framers attempted to ensure personal free-
dom by imposing sufficient restraints on governmental action, thereby preventing excessive
authority in one institution. T. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 4 (1974); see My-
ers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In Myers, Justice
Brandeis, employing the popular term separation of powers instead of the more technical
phrase checks and balances, stated:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787,
not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The pur-
pose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to
the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the
people from autocracy.
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mence war.2 Specifically, the drafters intended that the nation re-
main at peace until both Congress and the President agreed that
the national interest at stake justified the suffering caused by war.
Underlying the selection of this standard were three premises: first,
that war was a tremendous evil, an event to be avoided if at all
possible; second, that the decision to wage war was difficult and
thus readily subject to error; and third, that the possibility of such
error would be reduced if congressional participation in the deci-
sion were mandated.
For over 160 years, the executive and legislative branches ac-
ted in accordance with this three-premise theory, and the attend-
ant system of checks and balances. Despite grave threats to the
United States itself and American interests abroad, American
Armed Forces did not engage in any major military operation with-
out prior congressional authorization. More importantly, through-
out this period no President claimed any power to initiate combat
in the absence of legislative approval, with the sole exception of
authority to protect American citizens and territory. This practice
changed radically with the Korean war and since then the practice
of Presidents is to claim the authority to employ American mili-
tary forces to protect any alleged threat to the "national security."
Not only have courts rejected the claim of unlimited executive
war power, but the present presidential practice is inconsistent
with checks and balances. The first premise of the Framers is as
relevant today as it was in the 18th century, since the number of
casualties in any modern war ranges from high to cataclysmal. Sec-
ond, Presidents Truman through Reagan have adopted a foreign
policy of global containment, resulting in so broad a definition of
national interest that a virtually limitless number of nations and
events purportedly threaten national security. Third, contempo-
Myers, 272 U.S. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2 Many commentators note that the issue of war-initiating power was of deep concern
to the Framers, and therefore was intended to be controlled by the system of checks and
balances. See T. EAGLETON, supra note 1, at 10-11. The Framers sought to create a proce-
dure whereby neither the executive nor the legislature alone could make a war-initiating
decision, and thus established a system which required approval of both branches to put the
nation at war. Id. at 10; see Casper, supra note 1, at 489-91; Ratner, The Coordinated
Warmaking Power-Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Roles, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 461, 461
(1971) ("divided allocation of warmaking authority reflects the familiar checks-and-balances
motif"). See generally L. HENKN, supra note 1, at 31-35; A. SOFAER, supra note 1, at 60.
Notably, even advocates of broad executive power concede that warmaking authority is
shared by the President and Congress. See, e.g., Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The
War Powers Act, 50 Tax. L. REv. 833, 834-35 (1972).
1983]
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rary Congresses are certainly capable of making a positive contri-
bution in the decision to commence war.
Moreover, a foreign policy of global containment in an age of
highly destructive weapons has resulted in American Presidents
jeopardizing upon their own initiative the paramount national in-
terest-preservation of the nation-state-for far lesser national in-
terests. This Article argues for the abolition of unlimited executive
war power and the restoration of procedure that is both less men-
acing and more in accordance with the constitutional principle of
checks and balances.
II. APPLICATION OF CHECKS AND BALANCES TO THE WARMAKING
POWER
A. The Three-Premise Theory
Evidence that the Framers intended the war-initiating power3
3 The constitutional authority to conduct war must be distinguished from the power to
initiate war. The power to initiate war requires the approval and consent of both the Con-
gress and the President. See L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 105-08; A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPE-
MlAL PRESIDENCY 5-7 (1973). One commentator has noted that the power to initiate war is
one of "joint possession." A. SCHLESINGER, supra, at 7; see W. REVELEY, WAR POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS-WHo HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OLIvE BRANCHES? 63-64 (1981).
The Second Circuit on a number of occasions has observed that the power to initiate war is
a power that is shared by both political branches, and, therefore, both branches must par-
ticipate in the war-initiating decision. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307,
1309 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1370
(2d Cir. 1971); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869
(1971); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 305-06 (2d Cir. 1970).
In contrast, the power to conduct war belongs exclusively to the President. L. HENKIN,
supra note 1, at 51-52; see Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827). In a discussion
of the President's right to conduct war after an invasion occurs, the Supreme Court stated
that "the authority to decide ... belongs exclusively to the President, and ... his decision
is conclusive upon all other persons." 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 30. Requiring legislative ap-
proval for such decisions as determining the movement of troops, weapons, and equipment,
where and when a battle would be fought, whom to name as officers to direct each opera-
tion, or whether to open a new theater of operations, would undoubtedly cripple the Execu-
tive in conducting war. See G. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 76-
77 (1919); Wallace, The President's Exclusive Foreign Affairs Powers Over Foreign Aid (pt.
2), 1970 DUKE L.J. 453, 463.
Despite exclusive presidential control over the conduct of war, it is clear that the Fram-
ers intended to apply checks and balances to the decision to commence war. See Wallace,
supra, at 462-63. The debates at the Philadelphia Convention, see infra note 5 and accom-
panying text, the Ratification Debates, see infra note 6, judicial decisions throughout the
nation's history, see infra notes 100-08, and many commentators, see L. HENKIN, supra note
1, at 33-34; G. SUTHERLAND, supra, at 72, state unequivocally that the war-commencing
power is a shared power. Notably, Justice Sutherland, a firm advocate of singleness of com-
mand and concentration of power in the President once war has been authorized, was
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to be subject to checks and balances can be garnered from the ex-
press language of the Constitution," as well as the debates at the
equally emphatic in recognizing that the Framers intended to apply checks and balances to
the decision to initiate war. Justice Sutherland stated that "[t]he Framers of our Constitu-
tion... concluded, and I think wisely, that such a power in the hands of a single person
was not consonant with the genius and spirit of a republic such as ours." G. SuriRzmD,
supra, at 72; see A. SoFAR, supra note 1, at 56.
' Advocates of a broad presidential power to commence war have argued that the Com-
mander in Chief clause, U.S. CONsT., art. II, § 2, cl. 1, is an unrestricted grant of power to
the President to utilize the armed forces as he sees fit. See U.S. Dep't of State, The Legality
of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam, 54 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 474, 484
(1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 State Dep't Memo]; U.S. Dep't of State, Authority of the
President to Repel the Attack in Korea, 23 DEP'T ST. BULL. 173 passim (1950) [hereinafter
cited as 1950 State Dept Memo]. These advocates, therefore, construe the Commander in
Chief clause expansively, and narrowly construe the clause granting Congress the power to
declare war. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 11. This interpretation of the interplay of these
clauses, however, is contrary to the original meaning of these clauses. In fact, the Framers
intended the function of Commander in Chief to be nothing more than the supreme com-
mander of the American Army and Navy. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 69, at 446, 450
(A. Hamilton); see E. CORWIN, THE PRESmENT. OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 228 (4th
rev. ed. 1957). Professor Corwin stated that the only power the Framers intended to grant
the President under the Commander in Chief clause is the authority to be
top general and top admiral of the forces provided by Congress, so that no one can
be put over him or be authorized to give him orders in the direction of the said
forces; but otherwise he will have no powers that any high military or naval com-
mander not also President might not have.
E. CORWIN, supra, at 228.
Clearly, a grant of authority to commence war unilaterally was not contemplated. Id.
Rather, the clause expresses the Framers' intent that the President, once war has been au-
thorized by Congress, was to possess an untrammeled power to command and to direct the
movements of the naval and land forces. Id. Moreover, despite claims by advocates of broad
executive warmaking powers that the grant of the power "to declare war" is the authority
only to issue a formal declaration of war, it is evident that the Framers understood "de-
clare" to mean authorize, make, or commence. L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 80-81; Lofgren,
War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 695
(1972); see Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.)
37, 43 (1800). In Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971), the First Circuit cited
Bas v. Tingy with approval and quoted the following language from that early case: "The
hostilities against France in 1799 were ... an authorized but undeclared state of warfare."
Id. at 33.
To be sure, the clause "to declare war" initially was worded to grant "[tihe Legislature
of the United States ... the Power... to make war... ." 2 M. FAREAND, THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 167-68 (rev. ed. 1937). This clause was considered
by the full Convention on August 17, 1787, id. at 318-19, and amended by deleting "make"
and inserting "declare" in its place, id. According to Madison, this language change was
needed to leave "to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks." Id. at 318. Delegates
King and Ellsworth propounded an additional reason for this alteration: that "make" war
might be understood to mean "conduct" war which was an established executive function.
Id. at 319. Thus, the change was not designed to take the warmaking initiative from Con-
gress, but was intended instead to permit the President simply to defend American territory
and to direct movement of the armed forces, following congressional authorization of war.
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Philadelphia Convention 5 and the state ratification conventions.' It
appears that imposition of the checks-and-balances standard to
the war-initiating decision was founded upon three premises.
The first premise is derived from the Framers' attitude toward
war. As opposed to viewing war as an ennobling event, the Framers
regarded war as an event of grave consequence. Indeed, many com-
mentators have concluded that statements of the Framers made
during the constitutional debates manifest an unequivocal revul-
sion toward war's destructiveness.
Second, the Framers perceived that defining national interests
worthy of protection was not objective and error-free but a subjec-
tive and difficult determination." Further, even assuming universal
6 See DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 418-19 (G. Hunt & J. Scott ed.
1920) [hereinafter cited as DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]. But see Lofgren, supra
note 4, at 675 ("the manner in which the nation should be committed to war was not one of
the chief concerns of the delegates [at the] Philadelphia Convention").
6 The ratifiers expressed views on the war-initiating decision similar to those put forth
at the Philadelphia Convention, see supra note 5 and accompanying text, concluding that
the war powers should be shared, see A. SOFAER, supra note 1, at 48-51. According to James
Wilson:
This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will
not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such
distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at
large: and this declaration must be made with the concurrence of the House of
Representatives: from this circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that
nothing but our national interest can draw us into a war.
II THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION IN 1787, at 528 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter cited as DEBATES]. Significantly,
the Commander in Chief power received "extraordinarily short treatment." A. SOFAER,
supra note 1, at 48.
See, e.g., Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29, 36 (1972). The
Framers' aversion to war, according to Raoul Berger, influenced their decision to split the
warmaking powers. Id. Similarly, Justice Story recognized the Framers' attitude toward war
as bearing upon the division of warmaking power: "[T]he power of declaring war is ... so
critical and calamitous, that it requires the utmost deliberation, and the successive review of
all the councils of the nation ... ." Id. at 82 (quoting 3 J. STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1166, at 60 (1833); see 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 4,
at 316; Reveley, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or Usurpation?, 55
VA. L. REv. 1243, 1284 (1969) ("[t]he Framers recognized the potentially momentous conse-
quences of foreign conflict and wished to check its unilateral initiation by any single individ-
ual or group"). See generally Rostow, supra note 2, at 841 (discussing whether the drafters
of the Constitution intended "to make it hard to go to war, and easy to make peace").
a Note, Congress, the President and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARv.
L. REV. 1771, 1783 (1968). A nation can decide that some interests are important enough
that safeguarding them is worth the cost of war. Id.; B. BRODIE, WAR AND PoLrrncs 342-45
(1973). In addition to the paramount goal of retaining the independence and integrity of the
United States, the maintenance of a balance of power, the advancement of the import and
export of trade, and the promotion of ideological aims abroad were deemed to be legitimate
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agreement as to the scope of national interest, the Framers realized
that the decision as to whether any given national interest out-
weighed the potential misery of war was similarly subject to error.9
Third, the Framers believed that congressional participation
in a decision to initiate war would reduce the probability that
American citizens would be required to fight in an unnecessary
objectives of the National Government. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 6, at 111-13
(A. Hamilton); W. RosTow, THE DIFFUSION OF POWER 607-10 (1972). See generally F.R.
DuuLLs, AmERmcA'S RISE TO WORLD POWER 1 (1954).
At all times, the proper scope of the national interest is subject to debate. As one com-
mentator noted:
We hear much glib talk about those interests, as if the speakers knew exactly what
they are or ought to be. Yet they are not fixed by nature nor identifiable by any
generally accepted standard of objective criteria. They are instead the products of
fallible human judgment, on matters concerning which agreement within the na-
tion is usually less than universal.
B. BRODIE, supra, at 343. Some have defined national interest broadly. For example, in 1812,
Speaker of the House Henry Clay and Senator John C. Calhoun argued that the United
States had an interest in maintaining its trade relations with every nation and had an inter-
est in defending the international legal principle of freedom of the seas. R. FmELL, AMERI-
CAN DIPLOMACY 136-38 (3d ed. 1975). Other members of Congress, however, failed to adopt
such a broad definition of national interest. Id. at 139. More contemporary assessments of
national objectives may or may not include avoidance of nuclear conflict, creation of a more
stable world order, or maintenance of the credibility of a promise to defend other nations
from attack. See R. CLOUGH, EAST ASIA AND U.S. SECuRrrY 29 (1975); W. RosTow, supra, at
605-11.
9 The fact that a national interest is at stake does not end the inquiry as to whether a
war should be commenced. Indeed, the question remains whether the national interest is
worth the suffering of war. This decision is more subjective, more difficult, and more prone
to error than the decision of defining the scope of national interest. The Framers were de-
termined to avoid the misery attendant to war unless the gain to the national interest out-
weighed the costs. See War Powers Legislation, 1973: Hearings on S. 440 Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1973) (statement of Prof. -Bickel)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on War Powers Legislation]; S. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1967) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL ColsTlENTS REPORT]; W. REvELEY, supra
note 3, at 102; Reveley, The Power to Make War, in THE CONsTrruTioN AND THM CONDUCT OF
FOREIGN POLICY 93-94 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Reveley, The Power to Make War]; Ber-
ger, supra note 7, at 82; Reveley, supra note 7, at 1284 & n.138; Note, supra note 8, at 1784.
During the state ratification debates, James Wilson, one of the most active participants
in the Philadelphia Convention, commented that the Framers sought to ensure that war
would be initiated only after the President and Congress concurred that the national inter-
est at stake warranted military involvement. 1 DEBATES, supra note 6, at 528. One commen-
tator noted:
Presumably, any resort to war... is justified only because in some sense United
States security is thought to be at stake .... That decision [to defend] will de-
pend on a variety of factors-proximity to the United States; the value of the
country as an ally;, other United States interests involved, such as military bases
and military sites; and the nature of the aggression and the aggressor.
Note, supra note 8, at 1783.
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war.10 Indeed, Alexander Hamilton noted that "it cannot be
doubted that [oint] participation would materially add to the
safety of the society,""' and regarded congressional participation as
reducing the probability of erroneously defining the national inter-
est.' 2 From these three premises, the Framers concluded that con-
gressional as well as presidential authorization is to be required to
initiate war.' 3
B. Assumed Authorization
Although the system of checks and balances articulated in the
Constitution applies at all times to the decision to commence war,
in certain instances the imperatives of the system can be fulfilled
10 The late Alexander Bickel, an eminent constitutional lawyer, stated that the Fram-
ers' requirement of congressional participation reduces the possibility that the nation might
shed its blood in vain. He observed that "Congress and the President are indeed capable of
acting unwisely, singly or together, but hopefully less likely together than singly." Hearings
on War Powers Legislation, supra note 9, at 23. Similarly, Professor Reveley recognized
that democracy "requires federal officials to take clear responsibility for national action and
account for it to the voters, all on the assumption that the full play of representative democ-
racy is most likely to produce policy in the general interest." Reveley, The Power to Make
War, supra note 9, at 93. Finally, the Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
states: "Recognizing the impossibility of assuring the wise exercise of power by any one man
or institution, the American Constitution divided that power among many men and several
institutions and, in so doing, limited the ability of anyone to impose tyranny or disaster on
the country." NATIONAL COMMITMENTS REPORT, supra note 9, at 26-27.
11 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 75, at 478 (A. Hamilton).
12 Id.
18 The Framers clearly and explicitly intended to foreclose unilateral executive action
to commence war. NATIONAL COMMITMENTS REPORT, supra note 9, at 8-9; T. EAGLHrON,
supra note 1, at 11-12; W. REvELEY, supra note 3, at 15-16, 54-56, 314 n.14; Berger, supra
note 7, at 82; Reveley, supra note 7, at 1284 n.138. At the North Carolina Convention,
Speaker James Iradell stated that "[t]he President has not the power of declaring war by his
own authority. . . ." IV DEBATES, supra note 6, at 107. Major Pierce Butler, a delegate to
the Federal Convention, voiced similar concerns at the South Carolina Convention. See id.
at 263. As a Congressman, Abraham Lincoln reiterated the intent of the Framers that no
one branch possess the power to commence war. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 42-43.
The Constitution was framed, Lincoln noted, so "'that no one man should hold the power
of bringing this oppression upon us."' Letter from Abraham Lincoln to W.H. Herndon (Feb.
15, 1848), quoted in A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 43 (emphasis in original). If Congress
should favor war while the President opposes it, Congress similarly would be without power
to put the nation at war. See C. BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE ExEcUTIvE IN THE UNITED
STATES 93-95 (1921). See generally Baldwin, The Share of the President of the United
States in a Declaration of War, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 7, 10-11 (1918). Congress, however,
typically has been the less militant branch. See FouNDATIONS OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1775-
1872, at 261-62 (R. Ferrell ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN DiPLO-
MACY] (suggesting that the President is more apt to favor war than Congress).
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without actual congressional authorization;1' that is, a legislative
grant of authority to the President to wage war at times can be
assumed. This assumed authority can be invoked only when the
following condition is satisfied: a congressional vote in favor of war
is a foregone conclusion.15 Clearly, the circumstances in which it
can be properly asserted that congressional approval is a foregone
conclusion are rare.16
Only a single case occurred to the Framers in which the re-
quirement of legislative authorization can be fulfilled without an
actual statute: surprise attack against the United States when Con-
gress is not in session.' 7 The Framers' decision to exempt this cate-
gory and the decision's underlying rationale provide guidance in
identifying other situations, if any, in which assumed authorization
can fulfill checks-and-balances requirements.
Inherent in the exemption of an attack on American territory
is the recognition that defense of the American state is a national
" The Framers believed that a unilateral presidential power to defend the nation's ter-
ritory from attack when Congress was out of session could be exercised without explicit
congressional authorization. NATIONAL CoMMrrMENTs REPORT, supra note 9, at 8-9; 2 M.
FARRAND, supra note 4, at 318-19; Lofgren, supra note 4, at 700; Van Alstyne, Congress, the
President, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. Rav. 1, 9
(1972).
" Note, supra note 8, at 1783.
18 Id.
17 Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Note, supra note 8, at 1784;
see U.S. CONST. art. IH, § 2, cl. 1. In The Prize Cases, the Supreme Court stated that the
President possesses a unilateral authority to protect the political independence of the state.
See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863). At issue in The Prize Cases was the
validity of President Lincoln's unilateral decision to blockade the ports of the rebellious
South. See id. at 665-66. In dictum, the majority opinion accepted the premise that in the
case of surprise attack against American territory, congressional authorization is conclu-
sively presumed, stating that "[i]f war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the Presi-
dent is not only authorized but bound to resist force, by force." Id. at 668. Therefore, in
such circumstance, the President need not await special legislative authorization. Id.
The unqualified recognition of the legality of unilateral use of force by a President in
defending the territorial integrity and political independence of the United States was reaf-
firmed during the litigation concerning the constitutionality of the Vietnam war. For exam-
ple, in Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia stated:
[W]e are unanimously of the opinion that there are some types of war which with-
out Congressional approval, the President may begin to wage: for example, he may
respond immediately without such approval to a belligerent attack .... Other-
wise the country would be paralyzed. Before the Congress could act the nation
might be defeated or at least crippled .... Any other construction of the Consti-
tution would make it self-destructive.
Id. at 613.
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interest of the highest order."8 Only the American state can defend
the lives and rights of the American people.19 Absent this protec-
tion, the foreign invader would subject the American people to its
unrestrained power.20 The unique importance of this interest led
the Framers to conclude that every legislator certainly would have
voted in favor of a war to defend the American state.2"
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing discussion is
that checks and balances is the principle22 and actual authorization
by statute is the rule.2 Naturally, any exception to the rule must
be drawn narrowly so as to ensure consistency with the principle of
checks and balances.
Although the Framers considered only a single case in which
assumed authorization could be invoked,24 they decided to rely
upon governmental practice to establish any additional excep-
tions.25 The claims and actions of successive Presidents, the re-
sponses of the Congresses, and judicial review of the political
branches' interpretation of checks and balances were to be used to
1' See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Pursuant to article IV of the Constitution, the United
States guarantees "to every State in [the] Union a Republican Form of Government, and
• . . protect[s] each of them against Invasion.. . ." Id. In addition to protecting the lives,
liberty, and properties of its citizens from external threats of invasion, the state provides
internal protection and security from individuals within the state. See R. GILPIN, WAR AND
CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 15-18 (1981); J. HERZ, THE NATION-STATE AND THE CRISIS OF
WORLD POLITICS 126-28 (1976). Since the state provides its citizens with these essential ben-
efits-protection from both internal and external threats-it may be argued that the Fram-
ers assumed that any reasonable man would be willing to give his life to preserve the state.
' E.g., J. HERZ, supra note 18, at 100-04. According to Professor Gilpin: "The state is
sovereign in that it must answer to no higher authority in the international sphere. It alone
defines and protects the rights of individuals and groups. Individuals possess no rights ex-
cept those guaranteed by the state itself; they have no security save that afforded by the
state." R. GILPIN, supra note 18, at 17.
20 E.g., J. HERZ, supra note 18, at 100-04, 126-28.
22 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 4, at 318; Note, supra note 8, at 1783.
21 See supra notes 2-12 and accompanying text.
23 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
24 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
25 See Reveley, Constitutional Allocation of War Powers Between the President and
Congress: 1787-1788, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 73, 82-83 (1974). It is apparent that the Framers
deliberately refrained from providing an answer for every situation that might arise. Id.
Realizing the difficulty in foreseeing and outlining all possible exigencies, the Framers ob-
served that some areas would be better served by practice and experience. Id. In McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), Chief Justice Marshall stated that the function
of a constitution is to state fundamental principles and not to provide an exact answer to
every situation. Id. at 407. Chief Justice Marshall's analysis, although directed at the rela-
tionship between a national bank and the congressional commerce power, may also be ap-
plied to the assumption of legislative authorization and the principle of checks and balances.
See id. at 407-13.
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flesh out the checks-and-balances system.2" It is important to re-
member, however, that in implementing this authority, there must
forever be compliance with constitutional principles.27
III. THE CLAIMS AND ACTIONS OF THE POLITICAL BRANCHES
BEFORE AND AFTER THE KOREAN WAR
In examining the distribution of the warmaking power be-
tween the executive and legislative branches, a number of funda-
mental constitutional principles must be borne in mind.28 The rele-
vant authorities in determining the Constitution's allocation of the
war power are the claims and actions of the executive branch and
Congress, 29 judicial review,30 and the Framers' intent.31 Although
26 See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. The Framers were very conscious of
the interrelationship among the three branches of government. Madison's view of the "in-
tentionally 'mixed' powers" served as an insight into the purposes of the ambiguity. See A.
SOFAER, supra note 1, at 58. By not having a single superior branch, the interpretations of
each branch are valued and checked against the other two, thus serving as the fulcrum of
the balance of power. Id.
27 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177-78 (1803). If the Congress were
permitted to act in a manner contrary to the Constitution, "lilt would be giving to the
legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to re-
strict their powers within narrow limits." Id. at 178. It is therefore accepted that the officials
of the executive and legislative departments can utilize, but not exceed, the specific powers
accorded them by the Constitution. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405
(1819).
28 See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
29 See Rostow, supra note 2, at 846-48. Generally, courts regard the practice of the
political branches as a relevant authority in interpreting the Constitution. See id. at 850;
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236
U.S. 459, 472-73 (1915).
20 See Rostow, supra note 2, at 850. The Supreme Court, through judicial interpreta-
tion, has formulated rules of constitutionality, and these rules "have dominated constitu-
tional usage and doctrine." Id.
21 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 288-89 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). In Bell,
Justice Goldberg stated that, "[o]ur sworn duty to construe the Constitution requires...
that we read it to effectuate the intent and purpose of the Framers." Id. (Goldberg, J.,
concurring). Other cases also have stated this general proposition that the original under-
standing is a relevant authority in constitutional interpretation. See Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 532-41 (1969) (considering the Framers' intention to deny Congress the power
to vary membership qualifications); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (determining the original purpose of the fourteenth amendment); The Slaugh-
ter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-72 (1872). This proposition certainly has applica-
tion in determining the proper allocation of warmaking authority. See A. SCHLESINGER,
supra note 3, at 13-23. Only investigation into the intention of the Framers can disclose the
true meaning of the Constitution. Id. at 13; see Lofgren, supra note 4, at 673; Van Alstyne,
supra note 14, at 5-13.
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the question of whether judicial precedent overrides the original
understanding in constitutional interpretation is largely unset-
tled, 2 the initiatives of the political branches must yield to both
precedent33 and original understanding 4 when in conflict with
either.
A. Pre-Korean War Practice
The thirty-two Presidents and eighty Congresses of the pre-
Korean war period were presented with continual threats to a wide
range of important national interests, including the political inde-
pendence and territorial integrity of the United States,3 5 the main-
2 See generally Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional
Justification, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 278, 278-352 (1981). The engagement in noninterpretive
review by the Supreme Court when it looks "to a value judgment other than the one consti-
tutionalized by the Framers" is a subject of controversy. Id. at 279; see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST 1 (1980).
3 W. REVELRY, supra note 3, at 206. It has been noted that "[j]udges are... better
able than politicians to avoid the dangers accompanying constitutional evolution by prac-
tice. When ruling on the authority of the President or Congress, courts are less likely to
adopt self-serving interpretations." Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held the practice
of the President or Congress unconstitutional in a number of cases. E.g., United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969); Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952).
34 See Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 374-87 (1981)
(Framers' intent ranks higher in constitutional hierarchy than practice). In Powell v. Mc-
Cormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. of the 18th Con-
gressional District of New York claimed that he was unlawfully excluded from taking his
seat in the House of Representatives. Id. at 489. Although Powell met the standing require-
ments of age, citizenship, and residence contained in article I, section 2, of the Constitution,
id. at 489, the House claimed that it had the power to exclude him for certain acts of mis-
conduct, a ground which is not mentioned in article I, section 2, id. at 491. John McCor-
mack, Speaker of the House of Representatives and named as a defendant, claimed that
since previous Congresses had excluded member-elects on the ground of misconduct, the
congressional practice was authority for a power to exclude on grounds other than those
specified in article I. See id. at 544-45. Moreover, the House defendants argued that in the
event of a conflict between practice and original understanding, practice should take prece-
dence over original understanding. Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court stated that
the original understanding is a higher authority than the practice of previous Congresses. Id.
at 546-47. The broad exclusion practice, therefore, was unconstitutional because it conflicted
with the original understanding. Id.
Significantly, Professor William Van Alstyne noted: "The claim that constitutional le-
gitimacy may be settled by the sheer weight of an unexamined governmental practice...
ought not lightly be accepted. . . . [R]ecent practice is perhaps the least instructive source
of constitutional legitimacy." Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 3 (emphasis in original). Van
Alstyne observed that the executive and legislative branches' reliance on their own behavior
as authority was expressly and unequivocally rejected in Powell and Youngstown. Id. at 4-5.
'" See R. LECKIE, THE WARS OF AMERICA 222-29 (1968). During the period immediately
following the formation of the American nation, the very existence of the National Govern-
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tenance of the balance of power,3" the export and import trade,37
ideological concerns 3 and the protection of American citizens.39
ment was threatened by a lack of funds, a lack of administrative guidelines, and a lack of
armed forces. Id. at 222.
In 1814, the British planned a major invasion of the United States which might have
permanently detached large portions of territory from the American state. R. WEIGLEY, THE
AMERICAN WAY OF WAR: A HISTORY OF UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGY AND POLICY 51
(1973). The small, ill-equipped and uncoordinated American force was in real danger of
being defeated by the British with the consequent surrender of American territory and re-
linquishment of the newly won independence. In fact, when British forces attacked the na-
tion's capital in 1814, the defending militia fled Washington, D.C. The British then took
control of the national capital, convened a mock session of Congress, and debated whether
they should "bum the Yankee capital down?" R. FERRELL, supra note 8, at 143. The motion
passed and the British did just that, setting fire to the Capitol and to the White House. Id.
"8 See R. LECKIE, supra note 35, at 627-29, 677-707. Napoleon, who ruled France from
1799 to 1815, sought to destroy the balance of power in Europe and make France predomi-
nant. R. FERRELL, supra note 8, at 125. His attempt to upset the European balance of power
during these critical years in our nation's history meant a potential or actual threat to the
American state. Id. The period between 1815 and 1914 was one of relative peace and stabil-
ity in Europe. This permitted the United States to concentrate on its domestic policies.
Americans embarked upon a massive settlement and development of the states west of the
Mississippi River, engaged in a war with Mexico over Texas and other territory in the
Southwest, R. LECKm, supra note 35, at 320-24, and experienced a civil war to resolve such
issues as states' rights and slavery. Id. at 382-85.
The next surge of activity involving the world balance of power came with the Spanish-
American War in the late 1800's. See id. at 542-49. World balance received its greatest
threat during the periods accompanying the two World Wars when German forces were on
the verge of shifting the entire European power structure to an unbalanced domination by
Germany. See id. at 627-29, 677-707.
37 FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, supra note 13, at 11. From 1775 to 1872,
"[p]rotection and increase of commerce was an end of American diplomacy second only to
independence." Id. at 9. Moreover, in the post-World War H world, the health and prosper-
ity of the American economy is increasingly dependent upon international trade and invest-
ment. R. KEOHANE & J. NvE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 8-19 (1977). It is recognized that
international trade is an important determinant of the level of production, employment, and
inflation. See, e.g., W. SCHNEIDER, FOOD, FOREIGN POLICY, AND RAW MATERIALS CARTELS 39-
50 (1976).
"8 See F.R. DULLES, supra note 8, at 1. Historian Foster Rhea Dulles observed that the
encouragement of freedom thoughout the world has been a concern of American foreign
policy since the formation of the Republic. Id. America's commitment to advancing freedom
within foreign nations is grounded in both altruism and self-interest. S. HOFFMANN, DUTmS
BEYOND BORDERS 108-20 (1981). Under the premise that all human beings are equal and
entitled to protection for their lives, liberty and property, America has sought to bring these
benefits of democracy to people everywhere. See id. at 97, 108-10. In addition, America has
sought to promote human rights in order to create more moderate and stable nations. It is
argued that a government which mistreats its own people is also likely to be an aggressive
nation. Thus, the promotion of human rights would diminish the propensity of the dictato-
rial regime to commit acts of violence against its own citizens and its neighbors. Id. at 110-
11.
In addition to the desire to bring democracy and human rights to nations less fortunate
than our own, the United States has declared that it has an interest in preserving peace
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Yet, with the sole exception of the protection of American citi-
zens,40 no President ever claimed that congressional authorization
throughout the world. B. BRODIE, supra note 8, at 62. To be sure, it has been stated that
"'an orderly world requires a single durable structure of world security, which must every-
where be protected against aggression: if aggression were permitted to go unpunished in one
place, this by infection would lead to a general destruction of the system of world order.'"
Id. at 116.
"o Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique, 60 CAL. L. REV. 623,
655-56 (1972). Since the late 1700's, there have been roughly 80 cases of military operations
to protect citizens abroad. See id. at 654. In this regard, Chief Justice Marshall has stated:
The American citizen who goes into a foreign country, although he owes local and
temporary allegiance to that country, is yet, if he performs no other act changing
his condition, entitled to the protection of our government; and if, without the
violation of any municipal law, he should be oppressed unjustly, he would have a
right to claim that protection, and the interposition of the American government
in his favour, would be considered a justifiable interposition.
Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 120 (1804) (emphasis in original).
o See Wormuth, supra note 39, at 658-59. Under certain conditions, throughout the
pre-Korean war period Presidents and Congress conceded and courts endorsed assumed au-
thorization for the purpose of rescuing American citizens who were in immediate danger of
losing their lives. The conditions under which Presidents protected American citizens were
that no rescue mission could be dispatched unless the maximum number of American lives
to be lost were zero or de minimis and that these low casualties could be predicted before
the mission was dispatched with nearly complete certainty. R. Russell, The United States
Congress and the Power to Use Military Force 242-43, 312 (1967) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis
available from Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Library); see J. JAVITS, WHO MAKEs
WAR 51 (1973). The practice of Presidents complied with this stringent condition on all
occasions when military force was used to protect American citizens. Even though the armed
forces of the United States frequently landed on foreign soil for the purpose of protecting
American citizens, Presidents never sent an American force to rescue endangered Americans
in a strong nation which could fight back and inflict heavy casualties on the American
soldiers. See J. JAvITS, supra, at 105-11. Rather, they dispatched landing parties against
either weak states, R. Russell, supra, at 312, or people who were not even organized into a
state, id. at 242-43.
The response of successive Congresses to these presidential rescue missions was ap-
proval. Moreover, in the case of protecting American citizens in primitive, stateless territo-
ries or in states with weak, impotent military forces the judicial branch endorsed the presi-
dential claim and congressional acceptance of the executive practice. In The Slaughter
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), the Supreme Court, in dictum, stated: "Another
privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand the care and protection of the Fed-
eral Government over his life, liberty and property when on the high seas or within the
jurisdiction of a foreign government." Id. at 79.
In addition, the practice of the political branches was consistent with the Framers'
three-premise theory. The Framers' concern about the suffering caused by war was not vio-
lated in the case of conducting military operations against an impotent enemy. The maxi-
mum number of American casualties assuredly would be small since the American landing
party possessed overwhelming military superiority. Moreover, without the deployment of
the rescue party, the American citizens very probably would have been killed. Consequently,
the net effect of dispatching a rescue party was the saving of American lives.
The fact that the presidential practice of claiming a power to protect citizens was delib-
erately and repeatedly accepted by successive Congresses, was endorsed by the courts, and
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could be assumed until President Truman did so in June 1950.41
Successive Presidents, Congresses, and courts agreed that the
scope of assumed authorization extended no further than the pro-
tection of American citizens in certain circumstances and the de-
fense of the American state.42
It may be argued, however, that the modern world poses far
greater threats to national interests than those faced by pre-Ko-
rean war Presidents. It is useful in this connection, therefore, to
was consistent with the checks-and-balances system, leads to the conclusion that legislative
authorization can be properly assumed in the case of protecting American citizens in state-
less territories and powerless states. J. JAvrrs, supra, at 105-11. Consequently, the executive
branch acquired the unilateral authority to commence military operations in this narrow
situation.
In summary, before the Korean war, Presidents' unilateral warmaking authority was
limited to the narrow categories of protection of the state and citizens under limited
conditions.
41 See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 135-36. Senator William Spong, a member of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, observed that "[t]he sending of armed forces to
Korea in 1950 by President Truman without congressional authorization or consultation is
the first instance of a President claiming an inherent power to act 'in the broad interest of
American foreign policy.'" Spong, Can Balance Be Restored in the Constitutional War
Powers of the President and Congress?, 6 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1971) (footnote omitted).
It is important to emphasize that although many Presidents actually used the armed
forces for purposes other than the protection of state and citizens prior to the Korean war,
no President ever claimed a power beyond the narrow authority of defending state and
citizen. Instead, Presidents veiled their true purposes with a claim of protection of American
territory or citizens. J. JAvrrs, supra note 40, at 86-95. For example, in 1846 President Polk
rationalized an attack on Mexico by claiming he was defending American territory, specifi-
cally Texas, from Mexican attack. Id. Similarly, President McKinley's avowed military aim
in China during the 1900 Boxer Rebellion was to protect American citizens in Peking. E.
CORWIN, supra note 4, at 212. Perhaps the greatest obfuscation of the true purpose of a
military operation was Franklin Roosevelt's unauthorized naval deployments against Ger-
many in 1941. See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 111-13. In the summer and fall of that
year, President Roosevelt ordered the American navy to convoy British vessels into waters
which were patrolled by German submarines, and to "shoot-at-sight" any German subma-
rine which sought to attack the American convoy. Id. at 112. Although done to aid Britain
and preserve the European balance of power, Roosevelt asserted that his convoy and "shoot-
at-sight" orders were designed to protect American territory and citizens; he never claimed
any warmaking power beyond the traditional authority. Id.
42 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. Political scientist Francis Wormuth
and noted historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., both concluded that it was not until Truman
made a claim of general warmaking power at the outbreak of the Korean war that any Presi-
dent had claimed a unilateral power beyond the two traditional and narrow categories. A.
SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 138; Wormuth, supra note 39, at 664. Congress, after thor-
oughly studying the history of presidential warmaking, also concluded that Truman's claim
of a general war power was without precedent. A 1967 Senate Report in referring to Tru-
man's claim states, "here, clearly expostulated, is a doctrine of general or 'inherent' Presi-
dential power-something which had not been claimed by previous Presidents." NATIONAL
CommITAIENTs REPORT, supra note 9, at 16; see Spong, supra note 41, at 7.
1983]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:213
examine the dangers that confronted Presidents and Congresses
for a period of over 150 years. Despite glib assertions of the novelty
and gravity of the post-Korean war period, the threats confronting
the United States during the first quarter century of government
under the Constitution imperiled the very independence and sur-
vival of the nation.43 The United States Government fought wars
against France and England, the two greatest powers of that pe-
riod, to protect its existence, preserve the balance of power, and
defend its commerce. 44 Notably, both conflicts, the Franco-Ameri-
can War"' and the War of 1812, were authorized by statute.
The Monroe Doctrine, which proclaimed that the United
States Government would view any attempt by a European nation
to deprive a Latin American state of its newly won independence
as a threat to the security of the United States, was announced by
President Monroe in 1823.46 Certainly, maintenance of a balance of
"' See supra note 35 and infra note 44.
" R. LECKIE, supra note 35, at 223-29; see supra notes 35-38. During the early years of
the United States Government, the environment of war still existed. British influence was
still being felt in the Northwest since Britain had not removed the troops from seven posts
as it originally had agreed. Id. at 223. At the same time, the Revolutionary French Govern-
ment asked the United States to live up to the Treaty of Alliance which the United States
had signed with the French monarchy in 1778. R. FERRELL, supra note 8, at 75. As a result,
Britain began detaining French-bound American vessels in order to prevent American sup-
plies from reaching France. Id. at 224. The world balance of power was endangered as a
result of the cataclysmic war between Britain and France which began in 1793. See id. at
223; A. SOFAR, supra note 1, at 150.
46 For a discussion of presidential actions during the Franco-American War and the
War of 1812, see R. RUSSELL, supra note 40, at 89-102, 130-41. See generally C. BEMuL,
supra note 13, at 103; infra note 52.
In the early days of the Republic, the decision to fight to protect American honor
against France in 1798 and Tripoli in 1801 was authorized by joint resolution. A. SOFAER,
supra note 1, at 139-54, 214-16. In 1797, France issued a decree which charged any Ameri-
can working as a crewmember on a ship of an enemy nation of France with piracy. France
also began seizing American merchant vessels that did not comply with the edict. Id. at 139.
Eventually, "Congress transformed the national policy from peace to war, without a formal
declaration." Id. at 145.
"E. TATUM, THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 250 (1967). The "unsettled state" of Eu-
rope during the period preceding the Monroe Doctrine was a constant threat to the United
States, since any incident involving England inevitably would disturb American interests.
Id. at 252-53. Concomitant with the growth of resentment against Europe was a flourishing
of an American spirit of nationalism. Fueled by "[t]he feeling that the United States and
the New World were ... different from Europe and England,. . ." American policymakers
looked to maintaining the status quo amidst the turmoil of Europe. Id. At the same time,
Spanish colonies in South and Central America were gaining independence as emerging re-
publics. Id. at 260-61. The instability of these fledgling nations gave rise to the possibility
that France would intervene in their affairs. Id. at 253-55. Thus, the United States barred
all foreign nations from South America. President Monroe enunciated the doctrine which
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power within the nation's own hemisphere is a crucial interest. Yet,
when Colombia asked Monroe's Secretary of State, John Quincy
Adams, whether the United States would defend Colombia from a
Spanish invasion, Adams replied that congressional authorization
could not be assumed, and therefore statutory authorization was
required before the United States would implement the doctrine
with force.'7
One of the greatest threats to the global balance of power and
to the American state occurred when Nazi Germany attacked
France and was on the verge of defeating the French Armed Forces
and of occupying France.48 On June 14, 1940, French Premier Paul
Reynaud made an urgent request of President Roosevelt to commit
American Armed Forces to aid France. The French leader pleaded:
"'The only chance of saving the French nation, vanguard of de-
mocracies, and through her to save England, by whose side France
could then remain with her powerful navy, is to throw into the bal-
warned "Europe against interference across seas. . ." Perkins, Deter the Continental Al-
lies in the Western Hemisphere, in THE MONROE DocTRmNE 19 (A. Rappaport ed. 1964).
Although at the time, the United States lacked the necessary power to implement effectively
the doctrine, the admonition nevertheless bore an impact, primarily because the British,
anxious to maintain stability in South America, were able to patrol the waters of both North
and South America and ward off potential intrusion. See E. TATUM, supra, at 263.
'7 See Nerva, Egoistic from Its Pronouncement, in THE MONROE DOCTRINE 92, 93 (A.
Rappaport ed. 1964). In July 1824, the Colombian Minister to the United States, expressed
his joy "'that the government of the United States [had] undertaken to oppose the policy
and the ulterior designs of the Holy Alliance.'" Id. at 93. The Colombian Minister then
inquired as to the nature of resistance the United States would use against any interference.
In his reply, Secretary of State Adams stated that "'by the constitution of the United
States, the ultimate decision of this question belongs to the Legislative Department of the
Government."' Id.
4' See R. DvnNE, THE RELuCTrNr BELLIGERENT 83 (1965). After conquering Poland in
September 1939, Hitler waited until the spring of 1940 to resume his campaign of military
aggression. W. SHIRER, THE RIsE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 916-62 (1960). On April 9,
1940, German armies invaded Denmark and Norway. Id. at 697. Denmark was defeated that
very same day. Id. at 698. Norway was conquered by the end of April. Id. at 706-12. The
Ftlhrer then turned his attention to the West. Id. at 713. On May 10, Nazi armies attacked
Belgium, the Netherlands, and France. Id. at 770. The Dutch surrendered by May 15. Id. at
948.
While the French and British moved to reinforce Belgium, the Nazis readied for the
penetration of France by way of the Ardennes. Id. at 723. This rough-terrained area was
considered the most unlikely invasion site. See id. When the Nazis tore a 50-mile-wide gap
in the Allied front on May 13, the German breakthrough was met with little, if any, resis-
tance. France's strategic reserve was virtually nonexistent, an incredible condition consider-
ing that the conflict had barely begun. Id. at 726. So powerful and swift were the blitzkrieg-
ing German forces, that within a week after the invasion had begun, it was obvious that the
French Army was going to be defeated by the revolutionary changes in weaponry and strat-
egy that the Nazis had developed and deployed. See id. at 723-28.
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ance, this very day, the weight of American power.' ,,4 Reynaud
and Roosevelt both fully understood the grave consequences of a
Nazi conquest of France-complete German control over continen-
tal Europe. The Ftihrer could then direct his attention and his
armed forces against Great Britain and ultimately the United
States.
Roosevelt replied to this urgent request with what came to be
known as the Utmost Sympathy Speech.50 Roosevelt praised the
French soldiers for their heroic resistance to German aggression
and expressed his utmost sympathy for their plight, but refrained
from committing American military power. Recognizing that it was
a foreign state that was to be defended and not the territory of the
United States, Roosevelt concluded: "These statements carry with
them no implication of military commitments. Only the Congress
can make such commitments."'5 1
While American blood was shed in the pre-Korean war period
to protect such essential national interests as the balance of power,
economic concerns, and ideological commitments, it was not shed
unless and until Congress concurred. Thus, the naval war against
France, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Spanish-American
War, World War I, and World War II were all authorized by stat-
ute.52 In all of these instances, the definition of the national inter-
49 R. DIVINE, supra note 48, at 84.
50 E. CORWIN, supra note 4, at 246.
1 Id.
52 See C. BERDAHL, supra note 13, at 103; R. LECKIE, supra note 35, at 327. The deci-
sion to go to war with France was a joint judgment. C. BERDAHL, supra note 13, at 103. The
legislative authorization was expressed in the form of a joint resolution. A. SOFAER, supra
note 1, at 139-54. The 1812 war against Britain was authorized by declaration of war. Id. at
287.
After the War of 1812, a sense of nationalism grew in the United States which
culminated in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, R. LECKIE, supra note 35, at 318-20; see supra
note 46 and accompanying text, and manifested itself in the westward expansion of the
United States. This expansion resulted in a conflict over the territory of Texas between
Corpus Christi and the Rio Grande River. See T. FRANCK & E. WEIsBAND, FOREIGN POLICY
BY CONGRESS 65 (1979). Two weeks after Mexico had ambushed an American camp across
the Rio Grande, President Polk approached Congress and received a formal declaration of
war and a $10 million appropriation for war purposes. R. LECKIE, supra note 35, at 327.
The Spanish-American War found its origins in the Cuban revolt against Spanish rule.
American sympathies demanded intervention on behalf of the revolutionaries. After the de-
struction of the American battleship U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbor, President McKinley
"asked Congress for authority to use force to intervene ...... Id. at 546. On April 25, 1898,
Congress declared a state of war between Spain and the United States. Id.
Still another example of congressional participation in the warmaking decision came
with the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, which authorized the President to raise the
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est and the decision to wage war to protect it were joint determina-
tions of the President and Congress.
B. The Korean War and the Cold War Claim of an Unlimited
Unilateral Power to Initiate War
In the early morning of June 25, 1950, the North Korean Dem-
ocratic People's Army launched a massive offensive in an effort to
reunite the northern and southern portions of Korea.53 That eve-
ning, the Truman administration decided to commit American air
and sea forces to the support of South Korea. 54 On June 29, Tru-
man decided to make a commitment of ground forces . 5 Thus, for
necessary number of men needed to fight in World War I. See C. BERDAHL, supra note 13, at
107. Although President Wilson initially attempted to remain out of the war with Germany,
he eventually concluded that "[t]he world must be made safe for democracy" and asked
Congress for a declaration of war on Germany. Wilson received the authorization on April 6,
1917. R. LECKIE, supra note 35, at 629. Finally, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
on December 7, 1941, Roosevelt called upon Congress to declare a state of war to counter
"the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan." F.R. DULLES, supra note 8, at 207.
53 3 S. MomsoN, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AmRIcAN PEOPLE 432 (1972). Prior to
the conclusion of World War H, Korea was divided at the 38th parallel. The North was
occupied by the Soviet forces, which helped establish a pro-Soviet Communist regime. The
southern sector was occupied by American forces which helped establish a pro-American
government. By 1948, both the United States and the Soviet Union withdrew the vast ma-
jority of their troops from the area, leaving the two bitter Korean rivals with radically diver-
gent philosophies to resolve their differences by themselves. Id. at 432-33. Border skirmishes
began almost immediately after the withdrawal, threatening an outbreak of a full-scale civil
war. S. WARREN, THE PRESmENT AS WORLD LEADER 336-37 (1964). On June 25, 1950, an
estimated 90,000 Northern Korean troops pressed across the 38th parallel using hundreds of
Soviet-supplied armored tanks. The North Koreans launched the invasion in an attempt to
unify the peninsula under one government. R. LECKIE, supra note 35, at 850-51.
" R. LECKIE, supra note 35, at 853. While the Security Council of the United Nations
was preparing to meet for a discussion on the Korean crisis, President Truman instructed
General Douglas MacArthur to take command of American military forces and to use his
best efforts to defeat the aggressors. 3 S. MORISON, supra note 53, at 434-35. After examin-
ing the most productive avenues of assistance available, it was concluded that an immediate
supply of arms and equipment to the defenders was imperative. It was thus necessary to
employ American ships and aircraft to protect the supply lines as well as to safeguard Amer-
ican citizens yet unable to escape from South Korea. The President, moreover, positioned
the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Straits in order to deter both Communist and Nationalist
China from entering the conflict. R. LECKIE, supra note 35, at 853; see S. WARREN, supra
note 53, at 336-37.
55 R. LECKIE, supra note 35, at 857. The United Nations ordered a cease-fire with an
accompanying withdrawal by the North Koreans from territory below the 38th parallel. This
was ignored by the invading army, and the United Nations called for its members to lend
support throughout the conflict to the South Koreans. 3 S. MoRIsoN, supra note 53, at 435.
While this support was being organized, the South Korean troops were being pushed south-
ward. It became apparent to the President, through advice received from General MacAr-
thur, that the South Korean military was not capable of thwarting the North Korean thrust.
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the first time in its history, the United States began fighting a sus-
tained and major war without any congressional authorization.5 6
In an attempt to justify this action, the Truman administra-
tion claimed that the President, as Commander in Chief, possessed
the authority to begin a war to protect any "interest of American
foreign policy" without seeking and receiving legislative approval.57
This novel theory of presidential power was supported by the
claim that Presidents throughout American history had employed
the Armed Forces not merely for the protection of state and citi-
zens, but for the protection of any national interest.58 As has been
The President, therefore, ordered into Korea 83,000 ground troops with which MacArthur
could confront the approaching aggressor and protect South Korea against conquest. R.
LECKIE, supra note 35, at 857-58.
11 Address by Senator Fuibright, Yale University (March 3 to 4, 1971) reprinted in 117
CONG. REC. 10,355 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Sen. Fulbright Address]; see A. SCHLESINGER,
supra note 3, at 137.
'7 See 1950 State Dep't Memo, supra note 4, at 173 passim. The 1950 Department of
State memorandum stated:
The President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United
States, has full control over the use thereof. He also has authority to conduct the
foreign relations of the United States. Since the beginning of United States his-
tory, he has, upon numerous occasions, utilized these powers in sending armed
forces abroad. The preservation of the United Nations for the maintenance of
peace is a cardinal interest of the United States. Both traditional international law
and article 39 of the United Nations Charter and the resolution pursuant thereto
authorize the United States to repel the armed aggression against the Republic of
Korea.
The basic interest of the United States is international peace and security.
The United States has, throughout its history, upon orders of the Commander in
Chief to the Armed Forces and without congressional authorization, acted to pre-
vent violent and unlawful acts in other states from depriving the United States
and its nationals of the benefits of such peace and security. It has taken such
action both unilaterally and in concert with others. A tabulation of 85 instances of
the use of American Armed Forces without a declaration of war was incorporated
in the Congressional Record for July 10, 1941.
Id. at 173-74.
The memorandum reprinted the list of 85 instances of presidential use of American
force. Id. at 177-78. The memo asserted that although many of the 85 instances were for the
purpose of rescuing American citizens, in some of the cases the Armed Forces were used for
the purpose of advancing "the broad interests of American foreign policy." Id. at 174. It is
true that in a few instances before the Korean war, Presidents actually used the Armed
Forces for purposes other than the protection of state and citizens. Neither those Presidents
nor any other pre-Korean war President, however, ever claimed a power beyond the narrow
authority of defending state and citizen. See supra note 41.
88 Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; U.N. CHAnTER art. 39. The 1950 memorandum cites
resolutions passed by the Security Council pursuant to article 39 of the United Nations
Charter as authority for unilateral executive intervention into the Korean war. See 1950
State Dep't Memo, supra note 4, at 176. This claim, however, is spurious since United Na-
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demonstrated, historical precedent supports the very opposite con-
clusion. No President from George Washington through Franklin
Delano Roosevelt ever claimed any authority beyond the defense
of state and citizens.59 Like the commitment of forces itself, this
claim of presidential power was without precedent in American
history.
Truman's successors claimed and exercised authority to em-
ploy the full military power of the United States without limita-
tion. 0 For example, the Johnson and Nixon administrations made
tions resolutions passed pursuant to article 39 cannot accord the President war power be-
yond that which he already possesses. It is article 43 of the United Nations Charter that
makes provision for member nations of the international organization to "undertake to
make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agree-
ment or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage nec-
essary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER, art.
43, para. 1. In order to "prescrib[e] the domestic, internal arrangements within our Govern-
ment for giving effect to our participation" in the United Nations, Congress enacted the
United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (the Act). See 2 B. SCHwARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 190 (1963). The Act permits the President to exer-
cise unilateral war power pursuant to authority granted to him under an article 43 military
agreement, id. at 191-93, but prohibits him from exercising unilateral war power under any
other United Nations provision. See United Nations Participation Act of 1945, § 6, Pub. L.
No. 79-264, 59 Stat. 619, 621. Section 6 of the Act expressly declares that "nothing herein
contained shall be construed as an authorization to the President by the Congress to make
available to the Security Council. . . armed forces, facilities, or assistance in addition to the
forces, facilities, and assistance provided for in such special agreement or agreements." Id.
The legislative history reiterates the prohibition against the President acquiring any new
power through the United Nations Charter. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs as-
serted that the United Nations Charter did not create an inroad on "the exclusive power of
the Congress to declare war." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1945
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 927, 934.
Pursuant to the Act, before the President can commit any troops to an international
peace force, he must negotiate a military agreement with other members of the United Na-
tions and must submit this international agreement to Congress for its approval. Id. at 191-
92. At the time of the Korean war, no article 43 military agreements had been concluded. Id.
at 194. Consequently, President Truman could not, and in fact did not, rely on article 43 as
a source for unilateral war power. Id.
" See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
60 See T. EAGLETON, supra note 1, at 72, 76; A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 159, 170-
76. President Eisenhower worked closely with Congress with regard to the itse of military
force. T. EAGLETON, supra note 1, at 72. He often stated that he would use his authority to
commit troops in emergency situations but only within his constitutional limits and only to
protect American people and property. Id. at 72-75. This is evidenced by his congressional
request for permission to use force to defend Formosa and its neighboring islands against
attack by Communist China if it became necessary. See id.; Spong, supra note 41, at 7. In
1958, however, Eisenhower sent 14,000 American troops into Lebanon to stabilize a tense
situation and prevent a civil war. Eisenhower justified this hazardous military venture on
the ground that the President possessed the authority to employ the Armed Forces to pro-
tect the national security. A. SCHLESmGER, supra note 3, at 162.
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explicit assertions of presidential power to use force against any
nation for any purpose. In a 1966 State Department memorandum,
prepared by Legal Adviser Leonard Meeker, the Johnson adminis-
tration asserted:
Under the Constitution, the President, in addition to being Chief
Executive, is Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. He
holds the prime responsibility for the conduct of the United
States foreign relations. These duties carry very broad powers, in-
cluding the power to deploy American forces abroad and commit
them to military operations when the President deems such ac-
tion necessary to maintain the security and defense of the United
States.6 1
President Kennedy was even more bold in claiming and in exercising a capacious presi-
dential prerogative. T. EAGLETON, supra note 1, at 76. On his own authority, he ordered an
invasion of Cuba in 1961 (the "Bay of Pigs" invasion) and went to the brink of nuclear war
with the Soviet Union in order to compel the Soviets to remove missiles that they placed in
Cuba in 1962 (the "Cuban missile" crisis). President Kennedy did not believe that congres-
sional authorization was necessary to take these military actions. Id. at 76-77; A. Scii.Es-
INGER, supra note 3, at 170-76.
61 1966 State Dep't Memo, supra note 4, at 484. To equate the interest of defending
the state with defending the national security is, of course, fallacious. It has been concluded:
There are a number of difficulties with the theory that, for purposes of presi-
dential warmaking power, an attack on another country-even if under circum-
stances specified by a mutual defense treaty-is equivalent to an attack on the
United States. Presumably, any resort to war-even where authorized by Congress
-is justified only because in some sense United States security is thought to be at
stake. Hence, the fact that "security interests" are involved does not in itself alter
the normal processes for deciding whether such interests are worth defending at
the price of war. That decision, where a foreign state is attacked, will depend on a
variety of factors-proximity to the United States; the value of the country as an
ally; other United States interests involved, such as military bases and military
sites; and the nature of the aggression and the aggressor. In each case difficult
political and military decisions must be made which may well lead reasonable men
to different conclusions in determining whether the interest involved is necessary
to the defense of the United States. Where, on the other hand, the attack is
against the United States itself, there can be no question presumably that the
"security interest" involved warrants defending at the cost of war if necessary; to
require the President to await what amounts to an obvious, foregone conclusion
on the pat of Congress is at best a needless formality, and at worst may occasion
dangerous delay.
Note, supra note 8, at 1783. Bernard Brodie observes that the defense of state is an interest
of a different character than the defense of the national security. B. BRODIE, supra note 8, at
344, 347; see supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
The unilateral executive power to protect American territory is a power granted to the
President. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863). In contrast, the Framers
did not grant the President a unilateral power to defend the "national security." Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641-42 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); The
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28
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The 1966 memorandum broadly construed the power granted to
the President at the Constitutional Convention "'to repel sudden
attack.'" The memo then continued:
In 1787 the world was a far larger place and the Framers
probably had in mind attacks upon the United States. In the 20th
Century, the world has grown much smaller. An attack on a coun-
try far from our shores can impinge directly on the nation's
security.
The Constitution leaves to the President the judgment to de-
termine whether the circumstances of a particular armed attack
are so urgent and the potential consequences so threatening to
the security of the United States that he should act without for-
mally consulting the Congress. 2
Similarly, President Nixon justified bombing attacks on Laos and
Cambodia by claiming authority to send troops into foreign territo-
ries on his own initiative.6 3
According to the 1967 National Commitments Report of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "every President since
World War II has asserted at one time or another that he had the
authority to commit the armed forces to conflict without the con-
sent of Congress. 6e4 Moreover, even when no claim was asserted,
these Presidents have undertaken military action as though they
possessed this authority.6 5 Despite variations in the forcefulness
(1801). Indeed, unlike the concept of defense of state, which is recognized in judicial deci-
sions as well as in the original understanding, the concept of defense of "national security"
is without any constitutional roots. The phrase "national security" was not even coined until
1945. D. YERGIN, SHATTERED PEACE: THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR AND THE NATIONAL SE-
CURITY STATE 194-96 (1977).
11 1966 State Dep't Memo, supra note 4, at 484-85.
63 See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 190-94; Wormuth, supra note 39, at 623-25,
650-51. President Nixon faced the decision of whether to continue military action in South-
east Asia after the termination of the Vietnam war via the Paris agreement. The issue arose
in response to North Vietnam's refusal to withdraw its forces from Cambodia and Laos as
was stipulated in the ratified agreement. The President, claiming an inherent power to order
bombing attacks pursuant to the Paris agreement, authorized such bombings at an esti-
mated cost of $4,800,000 per day. T. EAGLETON, supra note 1, at 154-59.
64 NATIONAL COMMITMENTS REPORT, supra note 9, at 21.
65 An example of unilateral presidential action was the dispatch of troops to Lebanon
in 1958 by President Eisenhower. This followed the withdrawal of French and British troops
from the Middle East as a result of the Suez crisis. Fearing a Communist incursion as a
result of instability of the region, the United States took an active role in providing both
economic and military aid. A. GEORGE & R. SMouE, DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POL-
ICY 309-10 (1974). In July 1958, President Eisenhower employed military intervention in an
attempt to stabilize a civil war in Lebanon. Id. at 349. It is believed that President Eisen-
hower committed troops not only to prevent Soviet subversion, but also to improve the
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with which modern Presidents have put forward their claim of un-
limited war power, not a single one has repudiated Truman's the-
ory.66 To the contrary, all have acted as though Truman's usurpa-
image of the United States in the eyes of its allies and to impress upon the Soviets that the
United States backs its commitments. Id. at 353.
In addition, during the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy committed naval forces
to a blockade of Cuba in 1962 to compel the Soviet Union to withdraw the medium and
intermediate range ballistic missiles which they had sent into the country. The Soviets in-
tended to supply Cuba with an arsenal capable of penetrating far into the United States.
See id. at 447-48, 460; R. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS 5 (1971).
Other examples of unilateral presidential action include President Johnson's deploy-
ment of marines into the Dominican Republic in 1965, see B. BLECKMAN & S. KAPLAN,
FORCE WITHIOUT WAR-U.S. ARMED FORCES AS A POLITICAL INSTRumENT 289-342 (1978),
President Nixon's coercive diplomacy during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, see M. KALB & B.
KALB, KISSINGER 450-99 (1974), and the war in Vietnam, see D. HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND
THE BRIGHTEST 805-09 (1973). More recently, President Reagan committed 800 marines, as
part of a 2,000-member peacekeeping force, to Beirut to aid in the evacuation of the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization forces from that city. This peacekeeping force was comprised
of American, French and Italian troops. After accomplishing their task in Lebanon, they
withdrew on September 10, 1982, only to be ordered back to that country by President
Reagan following a bloody massacre of Palestinians by the Christian Militia forces in West
Beirut. U.S. Presses Israel to Let UN Troops Move Into Beirut, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1982,
at 1, col. 6. A senior State Department official indicated that Congress would be informed of
the deployment of the combat force. U.S. Plans to Send Marines Back into Beirut; Reagan
Terms Israeli Pullout 'Essential,' N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
The United States also has adopted a significant commitment to El Salvador. President
Reagan has asked for over $100 million in both economic and military aid to that country.
U.S. Is Said to Plan $100 Million Rise in Salvadoran Aid, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1982, at 1,
col. 6. This country also has top military advisers in El Salvador and, although President
Reagan has stated unequivocally that the United States will not send troops into that coun-
try, id., he has not ruled out a blockade to stop the flow of arms to the guerrilla forces, id. at
12, col. 3.
" See J. JAvITs, supra note 40, at 251-52, 272-73. Truman's successors have encouraged
the myth that the office of the President possesses a virtually unlimited war power. Id. at
251. "Many advocates of presidential prerogative in the field of war and foreign policy...
[argue] that the President's powers as Commander in Chief are what the President alone
defines them to be." Id. at 272. In 1967, the Senate repudiated such a broad reading of the
Commander in Chief clause. NATIONAL COMMITMENTS REPORT, supra note 9, at 23.
In addition, the Supreme Court has refused to accept such a construction. See Fleming
v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 614 (1850). In Fleming, the Supreme Court stated:
[The President's] duty and his power are purely military. As commander-in-chief,
he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed
by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most
effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy.
Id. at 615.
In a more recent case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952),
Justice Jackson rejected the idea that the Commander in Chief clause grants the President
the authority "to do anything, anywhere, that can be done with an army or navy." Id. at
641-42 (Jackson, J., concurring). Moreover, Justice Jackson characterized Truman's sweep-
ing view of presidential power as "sinister and alarming," id. at 642 (Jackson, J., concur-
ring), and endorsed the Framers' narrow interpretation of the Commander in Chief func-
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tion of power was legal. 7
The congressional response to this presidential claim of a uni-
lateral, unlimited war power during the height of the cold
war-the period beginning in June 1950 and ending approximately
by 1965-was generally one of acquiescence.6 8 The National Com-
mitments Report identified the perception of recurrent crises as
the most important cause of the presidential claim of unlimited
war power and congressional acquiescence in this usurpation. This
1967 report states that "crisis has been chronic and. . . has given
rise to a tendency toward anxious expediency in our response to it.
The natural expedient-natural because of the real or seeming
need for speed-has been executive action." 9 The report con-
cluded that the feeling of "anxious expediency" during the period
of peak cold war tension had caused Congress to disregard consti-
tutional procedure.7"
tion, id. at 642 n.10 (Jackson, J., concurring).
See supra note 65.
See NATIONAL CoMhlrrTmrrs REPORT, supra note 9, at 6. Congress is at least partially
to blame for the shift in the balance between the legislative and executive branches on the
issue of war powers. See Spong, supra note 41, at 10. Beginning with President Truman's
commitment of combat troops in Korea, Congress has been unmindful of the procedure
which the Constitution provided for the initiation of war. T. EAGLETON, supra note 1, at 70-
74.
Despite the usual response of acquiescence during the 1950-1965 period, voices of dis-
sent were raised in Congress from time to time. For example, in January 1951 Senator Taft
said that President Truman had no authority whatsoever to commit American troops to
Korea without consulting Congress and without congressional approval. "The President," he
stated, "simply usurped authority in violation of the laws and the Constitution, when he
sent troops to Korea ... ." NATIONAL CoMm rmNTs REPORT, supra note 9, at 16-17.
The greatest resistance to unilateral executive action during the 1950-1965 period oc-
curred in 1951 when Truman indicated his intention to send four more divisions to reinforce
the American Army in Europe without referring this momentous matter to Congress. See A.
SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 138-43. Since many members of Congress and presidential
advisers believed that the Soviet Union was poised on an all-out assault on Europe, the
President was claiming the authority to commit troops to a potentially major war against a
very large and powerful enemy. See id. at 139. Representative Coudert objected to Truman's
conception of limitless war power, stating, "[i]f the President alone is allowed to send any-
where abroad, at any time, hundreds of thousands of American troops without a declaration
of war ... then, indeed, there is little left of American constitutional government." Id. at
136. Coudert remarked that if Truman's theory of presidential power were accepted, then
the fate of American soldiers would be subject to the whim of presidential decree. Id. at 140.
This Great Debate of 1951 ended inconclusively. Id. at 143. The Congress did not forbid
Truman to send the four divisions to Europe, but the Senate did pass a "sense of the Sen-
ate" resolution in which the Senate approved the sending of the four divisions but stipu-
lated the necessity for future congressional consent to additional troop movements. Id.
69 NATIONAL COMMITMENTS REPORT, supra note 9, at 6.
70 Id. Senator Fulbright, a former advocate of unlimited presidential power, discussed
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Congressional acquiescence must be understood in light of the
Korean war's influence on substantially expanding the objectives of
American foreign policy interests71 and on creating a perception of
continual crises involving the forces of the free world, led by the
United States, and the forces of international communism, con-
trolled allegedly by the Soviet Union. 2 The world which existed in
1945 was undoubtedly a different world than the one which existed
before World War II. The invention of nuclear weapons, the col-
lapse of the balance of power in Europe, and marked improve-
how quickly procedure is cast aside when a crisis is perceived and quick and decisive action
is allegedly needed to meet an actual or potential threat. He explained that the cold war
crises had "one common attribute: the subordination of constitutional process to political
expediency in an atmosphere of urgency and seeming danger, resulting in each case in an
expansion of presidential power at the expense of Congress." Sen. Fulbright Address, supra
note 56, at 10,355. Arthur Schlesinger agrees that the presidential perception of global
threats and the propagation of a policy which committed American military power to the
containment of these threats extirpated the procedure of checks and balances, which was
believed to have become an obstacle to the alleged need for quick and decisive presidential
action. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 168-69. He proffered:
[Tihe Constitution could not easily sustain the weight of the indiscriminate
globalism to which the Korean war gave birth. It was hard to reconcile the separa-
tion of powers with . . . [the post-Korean war] foreign policy . . . nor with an
executive branch that saw everywhere on earth interests and threats demanding
immediate . . . American commitment and action. This vision of the American
role in the world unbalanced and overwhelmed the Constitution.
Id.
I 7 See A. GEORGE & R. SMOKE, supra note 65, at 140; A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at
135-37; cf. W. LAFEBER, AMERICA, RUSSIA AND THE COLD WAR 107-14 (4th ed. 1980) (discuss-
ing events triggering changes in foreign policy objectives and strategies). Professors George
and Smoke observe that the Korean war caused the globalization of containment. A. GEORGE
& R. SMOKE, supra note 65, at 140. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., also concludes that the Korean
war marked the abandonment of the previous foreign policy of prudent and limited contain-
ment and the adoption of an overzealous and ambitious policy of containing Soviet aggres-
sion throughout the entire world. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 168-69.
71 A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 163-65. The new American commitment to interna-
tional containment of Soviet aggression created the ever-present sense of impending con-
flict. The new objective was to preserve the non-Communist status of every non-Communist
nation. Id. at 164. Washington appointed itself the leader of the "Free World" and "en-
dowed itself with worldwide responsibility and a worldwide charter." Id. The United States
adopted increasingly large military budgets and upgraded its forces in size and technological
achievement in order to be able to counter a Communist move against any non-Communist
nation anywhere in the world. By 1952, the United States had 3.6 million men trained to
wage war. Id. at 165. This fact alone served to increase the presidential ability to take mili-
tary action since a large, effective fighting force was placed at the disposal of post-Korean
war Presidents who could use the great standing armies, navies, and air forces without any
additional congressional action. Id. America, for the first time, "possessed a standing army,
sufficiently large, sufficiently well-established, and sufficiently mobile to make possible,
through presidential action alone and on very short notice, conflicts of unforeseeable dimen-
sions anywhere in the world." Note, supra note 8, at 1791.
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ments in the range, firepower, and mobility of conventional weap-
ons, presented novel dangers to the defense and security of the
United States. 3 Yet, these changes did not cause an abandonment
of checks and balances during the period between the end of
World War II and the outbreak of the Korean war. 4 In fact, for 5
critical years, the Truman administration collaborated with Con-
gress to devise and implement a policy of containing Soviet expan-
sionism. 5 Commitments were made to defend Britain, France, and
other Western European nations vital to American security, but
73 J. SPANIER, GAMES NATIONS PLAY 116-20 (1972). The invention of the atom and hy-
drogen bombs, coupled with the development of intercontinental-range vehicles to deliver
the weapon, rendered American territory completely vulnerable to extensive and immediate
destruction. The fatalities from a nuclear attack could easily reach 100 million within 1
month. OFFICE OF OPERATIONS ANALYSIS, U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, THE
EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 16-26 (1979). Millions more would perish from disease, starvation
and radiation. Id. at 16. The destruction of the European balance of power presented a
second novel threat to the United States. J. SPANIER, supra, at 9-17; R.W. TUCKER, A NEW
ISOLATIONISM: THREAT OR PROMISE 39-44 (1972). From the end of the Napoleonic wars in
1815 until 1945, a balance of power had existed in Europe. No single nation was powerful
enough to control Europe. J. SPANIER, supra, at 10. Since no European power was ever able
to dominate or destroy all of its rivals, there was little or no chance that the United States
could be menaced by a European nation. Id. Thus, the balance of power had provided the
United States with its first line of security.
By 1945, the balance of power was destroyed. W. MILLER, A NEW HISTORY OF THE
UNrrED STATES 430-31 (1968). The Soviets emerged from World War II as the predominant
power; England and France had been weakened substantially, and defeated Germany was
destroyed and divided. J. SPANmR, supra, at 12-17. Consequently, the United States could
not depend on other European powers to insulate it from attack.
The second line of defense was provided by the vast distance between the continent of
Europe and the eastern shore of the United States. See R.W. TUCKER, supra, at 41; D.
YERGIN, supra note 61, at 200. The invention of long-range bombers and submarines re-
duced the military protection that the geographic buffer previously provided. Id.
74 See W. LAFEBER, supra note 71, at 75. During the 1945-1950 period, American inter-
ests were gravely threatened by actual or potential Communist aggression. In addition to
the risk that the Soviet Union would employ its military power against Western Europe and
the United States, Communist guerrillas had attacked the pro-American government in
Greece. Yet, the commitments to Greece and to the North Atlantic region were not made
without legislative authorization. See infra notes 75-76. In 1948, however, "a united admin-
istration, enjoying strong support on foreign policy from a Republican Congress, set off with
exemplary single mindedness to destroy the Communist threat that loomed over Europe."
Id.
I 5 See R. BARNET, INTERVENTION AND REvOLUTION 97-128 (1968). The policy of contain-
ing Soviet expansionism began with President Truman's address to a joint session of Con-
gress in March 1947 in which the President requested authorization to provide economic aid
and to send military personnel for the purpose of countering the Communist guerrilla move-
ment in Greece. E. MAY, "LESSONS" OF THE PAST 43-44 (1973). This signaled the beginning
of the implementation of the Truman Doctrine, a policy based on the commitment of the
United States to aid free peoples in maintaining their political independence and territorial
integrity against aggressive, totalitarian movements. See R. BARNET, supra, at 97-128.
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only after congressional consultation and approval. 7
The Korean war was a seminal event in American foreign pol-
icy as well as in American constitutional law. 7 Prior to the out-
break of the Korean war, the United States had adopted and fol-
lowed a limited and carefully considered containment policy.
Before the Korean war, the United States Government had identi-
fied only one nation, the Soviet Union, as its enemy.7 s In addition,
only nations such as Britain and France, which were intrinsically
vital to the American national interest, were considered worthy of
American military protection.7 9 As a result of the Korean war, both
71 See J. JAvrrs, supra note 40, at 242-44. The United States commitment to defend
Western Europe in the event of an armed attack has not been brought about by unilateral
presidential initiatives. Rather, these defense arrangements have always been subject to
congressional scrutiny. In June 1949, when the Truman administration was seeking passage
of the NATO treaty, Secretary of State Dean Acheson acknowledged that the Framers had
designed a system in which congressional power would check presidential power. He stated
that "[u]nder the Constitution, the Congress alone has the power to declare war." See S.
REP. No. 123, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1337 (1950). Moreover, he defined the term "war"
broadly, and submitted that independent presidential power existed only with regard to the
traditional categories of defense of state and citizens. See id.
The Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which considered and then
approved the NATO treaty reaffirmed the narrowness of unilateral executive authority.
"Would the United States be obligated to react to an attack on Paris or Copenhagen in the
same way it would react to an attack on New York City? ... The answer is... 'No."' S.
REP. No. 8, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1950).
7 See supra note 71. The effect of the Korean war on United States foreign policy has
been noted by John Lewis Gaddis, a leading diplomatic historian, who observed:
By the end of Truman's administration the United States had moved from
implementation of a restrained and cautious policy with limited objectives toward
a new and far more sweeping program of action that posited the challenge to
United States security as worldwide and made no real distinction between vari-
eties of communism. Containment became globalized; it was at this point that the
gap between Washington's commitments and its resources for meeting them began
to widen.
Gaddis, Harry S. Truman and the Origins of Containment, in MAKERS OF AMERicAN DIPLo-
MAcy 207-08 (1974).
7' See W. LAFEBER, supra note 71, at 27. Treatment of China during the 1945-1950
period is illustrative of pre-Korean war policy toward leftwing countries other than the So-
viet Union. No policy was implemented to check Chinese aggression on a permanent basis,
even though President Truman expected the Chinese Communists to invade Taiwan and
defeat Chiang Kai-shek's forces. See A. GEORGE & R. SMOKE, supra note 65, at 140. The
United States containment policy remained focused solely upon Soviet aggression until the
period immediately preceding Chinese intervention in Korea, at which time United States
policymakers realized the need to contain Communist China as well as the Soviets. Id. at
150. It was not until November 30, 1950 that President Truman intimated that "the United
States would use all its power to contain the Chinese." W. LAFEBER, supra note 71, at 119.
" See Gaddis, supra note 77, at 206-07. See generally R. BARNET, supra note 75, at 23-
24; B. BRODIE, supra note 8, at 343-65. Arthur Schlesinger wrote that prior to the Korean
war the United States had adopted a policy of responsible and selective containment, which
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tenets of American foreign policy-perceiving the U.S.S.R. as the
sole state that threatened the national security and defending only
intrinsically important nations-were altered radically.
After the Korean war, President Truman and his successors
abandoned the policy of limited containment and adopted a
sweeping policy of global and indiscriminate containment. As a re-
sult of the new containment policy, Presidents began to claim that
the threat to national security came not only from the Soviet
Union, but from any nation or any guerrilla group that was a par-
ticipant in the alleged worldwide conspiracy of international Com-
munism, directed by, from and for the Soviet Union.s0 American
Presidents adopted extremely broad criteria to determine whether
a war fought solely by the citizens of a sovereign nation-state was
in fact authorized by the Soviet Union.8 The application of these
was "addressed to the historic interests of the United States, committed only to regions of
the world where American security was directly and vitally involved . " A. SCHLESINGER,
supra note 3, at 168. Another author has observed that the "Cold War arose over the fate of
Central Europe, but it has been fought almost everywhere else." R. BARNET, supra note 75,
at 13.
so See R. BARNET, supra note 75, at 26-27. Beginning with the Truman administration,
American Presidents have conducted foreign policy on the assumption that any Communist
or leftwing nation which maintains beneficial relations with the Soviet Union is an agent or
puppet of the Soviet state. During the cold war era, Presidents have asserted that Mao Tse-
tung and Ho Chi Minh were nothing more than Soviet pawns. See id.
Both the belief that every Communist nation is part of a single international Commu-
nist conspiracy, id. at 60; see Paterson, The Search for Meaning: George F. Kennan and
American Foreign Policy, in MAKERS OF AMICAN DIPLOMACY 264 (1974), and the view that
the Kremlin instigates and controls the military activities of revolutionary third world coun-
tries, R. BARNET, supra note 75, at 60, have been used to justify the exercise of wide-ranging
powers by the President. Gaddis, supra note 77, at 212-14; Trask, The Congress as Class-
room: J. William Fulbright and the Crisis of American Power, in MAKERs OF AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY 351-52 (1974).
81 See R. BARNET, supra note 75, at 7. The following criteria have been used by Presi-
dents to identify whether a seemingly sovereign nation is actually no more than an agent for
the Soviet-principal:
a) whether a nation was ruled by a powerful Communist Party;
b) even if the Communist Party did not control the government, whether a
nation adopted Communist or leftwing policies such as nationalization, land re-
form, or "autarchic trade practices"; or
c) regardless of a nation's political system and domestic policies, whether the
nation took pro-Soviet actions in its foreign policy, such as signing a treaty of
alliance with the Soviet Union, accepting weapons from the Soviets, or even ac-
cepting economic aid.
Id. at 9; Gaddis, supra note 77, at 212, 214; Paterson, supra note 80, at 264; Trask, supra
note 80, at 351, 358; see Head, The Hot Deals and Cold Wars of Henry Kissinger, in AT
ISSUE: PoLrrcs IN THE WORLD ARENA 249-52, 254-55, 260 (1977); Raskin, An American Met-
ternich: Henry A. Kissinger and the Global Balance of Power, in MAKERS OF AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY 379, 381 (1974). Thus, Sukarno's Indonesia and Mossadeq's Iran, have been in-
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standards has led to the unreasonable conclusion of the executive
branch that when such nationalistic states as Mao's China, Sadat's
Egypt, and Indira Gandhi's India attack their enemies, these states
are no more than Soviet agents.
In addition, the Presidents of the global containment era have
declared that nations which have no intrinsic relationship to the
national interest are nevertheless vital to national security. 2 For
example, the United States fought in Vietnam" and may fight in
El Salvador8 4 even though these nations ostensibly add little if
anything to the defense of the United States, the balance of power,
or American trade and investment. This seeming paradox of de-
claring peripheral nations vital to national interests is based upon
Truman's dubious logic, enunciated at the outbreak of the Korean
war and maintained by his successors, that the United States must
cluded within Moscow's demesne. R. BARNrT, supra note 75, at 9.
82 See B. BRODIE, supra note 8, at 341-42, 351-55; Gaddis, supra note 77, at 205-09.
Brodie states:
In the instances both of Korea and of Vietnam, the citizenry repeatedly demanded
assurance that the purpose of the interventions was indeed to enhance American
security, and they repeatedly received that assurance from their national leaders,
who no doubt sincerely meant it. We saw the same thing happening in the case of
President Franklin Roosevelt and his assurances, but there are significant differ-
ences in dimensions between the menace posed by a Hitler on the rampage in
combination with Japan and Italy, and a Ho Chi Minh reaching for the control of
South Vietnam. It is a strange approach to international affairs that seeks to as-
sert that all threats to the peace are all on the same plane, alike not only in char-
acter but also in magnitude of danger; but this is what some of the more doctri-
naire purveyors of the "indissolubility of peace" would have had us believe.
B. BRODIE, supra note 8, at 353 (emphasis in original).
" R. BARNTr, supra note 75, at 29-31; B. BRODIE, supra note 8, at 347. The leaders who
committed American forces to the defense of South Vietnam, it is suggested, did not believe
that the conquest of South Vietnam would either make an attack against American territory
more likely, increase the military power of the Soviet Union, or impair American trade and
investment. Vietnam was merely a symbol in the struggle between the forces of the Free
World and international Communism.
I See Proposal for Aid to Salvador Cut By Senate Panel, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1982,
at 1, col. 2. It is difficult to conceive of a more strategically insignificant nation than El
Salvador. It is one of the smallest, poorest, least powerful nations in the world. Sanction,
Terror, Right and Left, TImE, March 23, 1982, at 28 (per capita income is $670 a year; the
Salvadoran Army consists of only 14,000 men, twice as many as the leftist guerrillas). The
Reagan administration may be willing to concede this, but it probably would argue that
what is at stake in El Salvador is the "worldwide Soviet interventionism that poses an un-
precedented challenge to the free world." Id. at 18 (quoting Secretary of State Alexander
Haig). Hence, in El Salvador, United States aid and military personnel are being used to
counter political forces which are perceived as threatening United States interests. In El
Salvador alone, over $60 million will be appropriated for military aid in 1983, despite some
limited congressional success in reducing such expenditures. Proposal For Aid to Salvador
Cut by Senate Panel, supra, at 1, col. 2.
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be able and willing to respond with armed force to defend a rela-
tively insignificant nation from aggression so as to render credible
the American commitment to defend more important nations.
Thus, it is contended, critical American allies are reassured of
American support and the Soviet Union and its "co-conspirators"
are deterred from further aggression.8 5 Hence, the hysteria un-
leashed by the Korean war and reinforced by the solemn pro-
nouncements of successive Presidents led to a foreign policy of po-
tentially defending any nation in the world." The broad definition
of Communist or Soviet-controlled, combined with an expansible
area to be defended from the Kremlin-led conspiracy, resulted in a
foreign policy of global and indiscriminate containment. It is with
this in mind that the congressional response of acquiescence to the
executive claim for power must be viewed.
In 1970, Congress used its financial power to prohibit the ex-
See generally B. BRODIE, supra note 8, at 201-02; R. BARNET, supra note 75, at 28.
One justification commonly relied upon for the use of American forces to contain the spread
of Communism in peripheral areas is that the perception of United States' reluctance to
participate in any conflict might encourage Russian aggression elsewhere. According to
Richard J. Barnet, United States policymakers view the Third World as "the testing ground
for the Communist strategy of Wars of National Liberation. If they win here, they will strike
elsewhere. If they lose, they will not be so ready to start another." R. BARNET, supra note
75, at 28. George Kennan, the intellectual architect of the containment policy, described
Soviet policy as tending to fill "every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world
power." G. KENNAN, AMERicAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950, at 118 (1951). Kennan believed that
Soviet expansion must be met wherever it is directed:
[I]t will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the
Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant ap-
plication of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and politi-
cal points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy ....
Id. at 120.
Daniel Yergin concludes that nations and events which have, in fact, a minimal and
remote effect or even no effect upon our national security are perceived as significant and
urgent, threatening our security immediately, directly, and momentously. He states:
And what characterizes the concept of national security? It postulates the interre-
latedness of so many different political, economic, and military factors that devel-
opments halfway around the globe are seen to have automatic and direct impact
on America's core interests. Virtually every development in the world is perceived
to be potentially crucial. An adverse turn of events anywhere endangers the
United States. Problems in foreign relations are viewed as urgent and immediate
threats. Thus, desirable foreign policy goals are translated into issues of national
survival, and the range of threats becomes limitless. The doctrine is characterized
by expansiveness, a tendency to push the subjective boundaries of security out-
ward to more and more areas, to encompass more and more geography and more
and more problems.
D. YERGIN, supra note 61, at 196.
86 See Paterson, supra note 80, at 279-81.
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penditure of appropriated funds to support American ground-
troops in Laos and Thailand, and to effect a complete cutoff of any
combat activity in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. 7 During the
1950's and 1960's, however, the response of Congress was
acquiescence. 8
It is important to recognize that this acquiescence did not
render the presidential practice legal nor permit the President to
acquire an unlimited power to use force to defend any national in-
terests. Rather, congressional acquiescence during this 15-year pe-
riod of crisis-induced fear is entitled to little interpretative weight,
since the precedents created during this interval were not based
upon a reading of the Constitution, but instead were based upon a
knowing disregard and abandonment of checks and balances. De-
spite attempts to legitimize the Chief Executive's seizure and exer-
cise of power in the 1950 and 1966 State Department Memos,"9 the
presidential theory of war power and the congressional acquie-
scence in it can most accurately be viewed not as a good-faith at-
tempt by the political branches to apply the Constitution to the
changed conditions of the post-World War II world, but as a de-
sign to avoid constitutional limits on executive war power. The ad-
87 See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 293. The June 1973 vote to prohibit the further
use of funds clearly demonstrated congressional opposition to the war. Id. At that time,
however, there was an insufficient number in Congress to override President Nixon's veto of
the funding cutoff. United States District Court Judge Orrin Judd noted that if the courts
were to rule that Congress was required to override presidential vetoes in order to terminate
unauthorized military actions, Presidents could sustain wars with the support of only "one
third (plus one)" of the membership of either House. See id.
" See Sen. Fulbright Address, supra note 56, at 10,356. No official congressional action
was taken to check the unilateral commitment of troops abroad until 1970. For example,
when President Truman committed United States air and sea forces in Korea without seek-
ing congressional authorization or advice, Congress, as a whole, remained idle. T. EAGLETON,
supra note 1, at 71. Some individual members of Congress, however, were quite vociferous.
Senator Robert Taft, for instance, stated that the President had "simply usurped authority,
in violation of the laws and the Constitution." Id. Similarly, Senator Arthur Watkins con-
tended that "the United States [was] at war by order of the President." Id.
89 See 1966 State Dep't Memo, supra note 4, at 474; 1950 State Dep't Memo, supra
note 4, at 173. The 1950 State Department Memo sought to justify President Truman's use
of American troops in Korea by asserting that previous presidential practice and a United
Nations Security Council Resolution were authority for this action. 1950 State Dep't Memo,
supra note 4, at 173; see supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. The 1966 document was
prepared for a similar purpose-to formulate a legal justification for President Johnson's
unauthorized use of military power in Vietnam. See 1966 State Dep't Memo, supra note 4,
at 474; see supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. The 1966 memo, however, argued that
the President's unilateral war power should be extended from a power to protect the state
to a power to protect the national security. See 1966 State Dep't Memo, supra note 4, at
474.
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vocates of abandoning constitutional principle attempted to justify
this action by a claim of "necessity."
The "necessity advocates" believed that a Chief Executive ca-
pable of taking quick and decisive military action on his own initi-
ative was necessary to contain effectively Soviet expansionism. In
1951, Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, claimed that in
time of crisis, constitutional procedure can be ignored in order to
permit the President to act. He suggested that "[w]e are in a posi-
tion in the world today where the argument as to who has the
power to do this, that, or the other thing, is not exactly what is
called for from America in this very critical hour." 0 In 1961, Sena-
tor J. W. Fulbright, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, argued that the ability to act is the sole issue, and that
it is irrelevant whether the procedure chosen for initiating the ac-
tion is constitutional.91 He advocated abandoning what he termed
"18th century procedures of measured deliberations" in order to be
better able to counter Communist aggression.92
In conclusion, notwithstanding that Congress did not repudi-
ate the claim of broad warmaking power during the period of acute
cold war tension but acquiesced in the presidential practice, Con-
90 A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 138 (quoting S. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
17 (1967)).
" Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century Under an 18th-Century
Constitution, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 7 (1961). Senator Fulbright admitted that congressional
acceptance of executive primacy in utilizing American military power was inconsistent with
the constitutional system of checks and balances, yet argued that constitutional principles
in this context should be abandoned:
[T]he price of democratic survival in a world of aggressive totalitarianism is to
give up some of the democratic luxuries of the past. We should do so with no
illusions as to the reasons for its necessity. It is distasteful and dangerous to vest
the executive with powers unchecked and unbalanced. My question is whether we
have any choice but to do so.
Id.
92 Id. A decade after he asserted that constitutional procedures were inappropriate in
the modern international arena, Senator Fulbright recanted his necessity argument. The
Senator recognized that the notion that necessity outweighs the Constitution was illegal,
unwise, and dangerous:
In those days [of the 1950's and 1960's] ... it was possible to forget the wisdom
of the Founding Fathers who had taught us to mistrust power, to check it and
balance it, and never to yield up the means of thwarting it. Now, after bitter expe-
rience, we are having to learn all over again that no single man or institution can
ever be counted upon as a reliable or predictable repository of wisdom and benev-
olence; that the possession of great power can impair a man's judgment and cloud
his perception of reality; and that our only protection against the misuse of power
is the institutionalized interaction of a diversity of independent opinions.
Sen. Fulbright Address, supra note 56, at 10,356.
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gress' response must be interpreted in light of the surrounding cir-
cumstances of continual crises and the consequent demand for
quick executive action. Presidents have promulgated a foreign pol-
icy theory of a ubiquitous Communist chimera which Congress ac-
cepted, along with the fallacious argument that in times of danger
constitutional procedure must be ignored and abandoned so that
Presidents can act. 3 Hence, little weight is to be accorded both the
claims and actions of the Chief Executive, as well as acquiescence
by Congress. Furthermore, the claim of necessity has been de-
nounced as an illegal and dangerous theory by the Congress of the
1970's. 4 Finally, the practice of the political branches during this
15-year period is inconsistent with two higher ranking constitu-
tional authorities-judicial review and Framers' intent.
IV. JUDICIAL REJECTION OF THE CLAIM OF UNLIMITED EXECUTIVE
POWER
The Supreme Court has rejected the claim that a crisis em-
powers the President to disregard the Constitution in order to pur-
sue allegedly essential emergency action. From the Civil War case
of Ex parte Milligane6 to the steel seizure case, Youngstown Sheet
" See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 141-52, 168-70.
NATIONAL COMMITMENTS REPORT, supra note 9, at 7; see Sen. Fulbright Address,
supra note 56, at 10,356.
" See C. RossrrER, CONsTrr iONAL DICTATORSHIP 212-13 (1948). In a discussion of
"crisis institutions and procedures," Rossiter stated that the Framers had considered the
theory that the President's powers should expand during an emergency, but they rejected
the notion. Id. at 212. As he observed: "Emergency does not create power .... The Consti-
tution was adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants of power to the Federal Gov-
ernment... were determined in the light of emergency and they are not altered by emer-
gency." Id. at 213 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934)).
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). In his opinion, Justice Davis rejected the contention that
the abandonment of constitutional procedures was justified as a consequence of emergency
conditions existing during the Civil War. Id. at 120-21. Referring to the constitutional sys-
tem formulated by the Framers, the Court stated:
Those great and good men foresaw that troublous times would arise, when rulers
and people would become restive under restraint, and seek by sharp and decisive
measures to accomplish ends deemed just and proper; and that the principles of
constitutional liberty would be in peril, unless established by irrepealable
law .... The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people,
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection. . . all
circumstances .... [T]he government, within the Constitution, has all the pow-
ers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence ....
Id.
During the Great Depression, a Minnesota statute was enacted which imposed a mora-
torium on mortgage foreclosures in the event of debtor default. Home Bldg.,& Loan Ass'n v.
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& Tube Co. v. Sawyer,97 the Supreme Court unequivocally has held
that all of the provisions of the Constitution will continue to func-
tion during every exigency.98 Justice Jackson's concurring opinion
in Youngstown contains a cogent repudiation of the claim of neces-
sity, warning that enlarging the power of the President during a
period of alleged peril is dangerous as well as unconstitutional.
Justice Jackson wrote:
[The Framers] knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures
they engender[ed] for authoritative action, knew, too, how they
afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We may also suspect that
they suspected that emergency powers would tend to kindle
emergencies. Aside from suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in time of rebellion or invasion, when the public
safety may require it, they made no express provision for exercise
of extraordinary authority because of a crisis. I do not think we
rightfully may so amend their work and, if we could, I am not
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 415-16 (1934). Although the Supreme Court upheld the statute, the
Court reiterated the Milligan doctrine, stating: "Emergency does not create power. Emer-
gency does not increase granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon
power granted or reserved. The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency.
Its grants of power... are not altered by emergency." Id. at 425.
In another Great Depression case, the Supreme Court struck down the validity of the
National Industrial Recovery Act. See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 528-29 (1935). The Schecter Court reaffirmed the principle that no crisis, no mat-
ter how severe or extraordinary, can justify the abandonment of constitutional procedure:
The Constitution established a national government with powers deemed to be
adequate, as they have proved to be both in war and [in] peace, but these powers
of the national government are limited by the constitutional grants. Those who act
under these grants are not at liberty to transcend the imposed limits because they
believe that more or different power is necessary.
Id.
97 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Holding that President Truman's seizure of steel factories was
unconstitutional, the Youngstown Court rendered seven separate opinions overwhelmingly
rejecting the view that a state of emergency justifies the exercise of powers not authorized
by the Constitution. Id. at 582-614. Justice Douglas, reaffirming the Milligan-Blaisdell doc-
trine, see supra note 96, stated that, "[tlhere can be no doubt that the emergency which
caused the President to seize these steel plants was one that bore heavily on the country.
But the emergency did not create power [in the executive branch] . . . ." Id. at 629 (Doug-
las, J., concurring). Justice Douglas reasoned further that expediency cannot justify reinter-
pretation of established constitutional doctrine, stating "[i]f we sanctioned the present exer-
cise of power by the President, we would be expanding Article II of the Constitution and
rewriting it to suit the political conveniences of the present emergency." Id. at 632 (Douglas,
J., concurring). The Framers' rejection of the theory that emergency can enlarge executive
power is also recognized and endorsed by the opinion of the Court written by Justice Black,
id. at 588-89, in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring), and in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion, id. at 649-53 (Jackson, J., concurring).
98 See C. RossrrER, supra note 95, at 211-15.
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convinced it would be wise to do so .... 99
With respect to the warmaking authority specifically, every
court which has addressed the claim raised by post-Korean war
Presidents of an unlimited, unilateral war power has rejected it. In
addition, contemporary courts, citing with approval pre-Korean
war precedent, have not endorsed unilateral executive authority
beyond the traditional categories of defense of American territory
and protection of American citizens. 00
11 343 U.S. at 650 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). In his Youngstown con-
currence, Justice Jackson rendered a strong repudiation of inherent power. See id. at 649-50
(Jackson, J., concurring). Having considered the case of Nazi Germany, which had adopted
the theory that necessity caused by crisis can expand the power to cope with an alleged
emergency, Justice Jackson stated:
This contemporary foreign experience may be inconclusive as to the wisdom
of lodging emergency powers somewhere in a modern government. But it suggests
that emergency powers are consistent with free government only when their con-
trol is lodged elsewhere than in the Executive who exercises them. That is the
safeguard that would be nullified by our adoption of the "inherent powers"
formula. Nothing in my experience convinces me that such risks are warranted by
any real necessity, although such powers would, of course, be an executive
convenience.
Id. at 652 (Jackson, J., concurring).
1o See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 288-95. Schlesinger correctly observed that
even though the courts did not declare the Vietnam war unconstitutional, no judge sus-
tained the war on the theory that the President possesses the power to protect the national
security. Id. at 290. Instead, the courts relied upon the political question doctrine, or found
congressional authorization in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, military appropriation bills
and selective service laws. Id. at 278-84.
The following is a nonexhaustive list of cases in which the constitutionality of the
United States involvement in the Vietnam war was questioned. Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d
611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973); Massachusetts v. Laird,
327 F. Supp. 378 (D. Mass.), af'd, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F.
Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972); Orlando v.
Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 869 (1971); Bark v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 722 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
In Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974), it was alleged that the military activities of the
United States in Cambodia violated article I, section 8, of the Constitution, inasmuch as the
activities had not been authorized by Congress. Id. at 554. After an initial victory was ob-
tained by congressional opponents of the war in Cambodia in the form of an injunction
against further bombing, the issue was eventually disposed of on the ground that it was a
political question, and therefore not a matter for the courts to decide. A. SCHLESINGER,
supra note 3, at 293-94. Although the Supreme Court in Holtzman denied certiorari, two of
the Justices rejected the claim of broad executive war power in opinions issued in chambers.
See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1315 (1973) (Marshall, J.) (application to va-
cate stay); id. at 1316-18 (Douglas, J.) (reapplication to vacate stay). For an excellent
description of the complicated procedural history of the Holtzman case, see Note, The In-
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In New York Times Co. v. United States,10 1 Justice Douglas,
in a concurring opinion, stated: "The Constitution by Art. I, § 8,
gives Congress, not the President, power '[t]o declare War.' No-
where are presidential wars authorized.' 10 2 In Holtzman v. Schles-
inger, 0 3 Justice Douglas reiterated judicial opposition to the post-
Korean war claim of unlimited executive power, citing The Prize
Cases 0 4 for the proposition that the President "has no power to
initiate or declare a war . . .against a foreign nation."' 0 5 Justice
Douglas observed that even though it has become popular to think
the President has the power to initiate war on his own authority,
"there is not a word in the Constitution that grants that power to
him. It runs only to Congress. "106
In Holtzman v. Schlesinger, Justice Marshall stated that the
scope of unilateral executive authority is limited to the case of a
pressing emergency, supporting this narrow construction by citing
the holding of Talbot v. Seeman'07 that the war power was vested
by the Constitution in Congress. Justice Marshall then rejected the
argument that the situation in the modern world required an in-
crease in executive power, stating that nothing in the 172 years
since the Talbot decision was rendered altered the requirement of
congressional authorization.
Additionally, the lower federal courts uniformly have repudi-
ated the assertion in the 1966 State Department Memo that the
President's authority should be broadened to include the power to
protect the national security, and have refused to recognize unilat-
eral executive power in any situation other than an actual invasion
of the United States. 0 8
dochina War Cases in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: The
Constitutional Allocation of War Powers, 7 N.Y.U.J. INTr'L L. & POL. 137, 147-60 (1974).
101 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
102 Id. at 722 (Douglas, J., concurring).
103 414 U.S. 1316 (1973); see supra note 100.
104 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862); see supra note 17.
105 414 U.S. at 1317-18.
106 Id. at 1317.
107 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
103 Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 304-05 (2d Cir. 1970); Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp.
538, 541-43 (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972); Orlando
v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013, 1016-17 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), af'd, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
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V. THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF THE FRAMERS' THREE-
PREMISE THEORY OF CHECKS AND BALANCES
The cold war practice of an unlimited executive war power is
in conflict with the Framers' theory of checks and balances. Con-
temporary Presidents and their advisers,109 as well as Congress-
men, 10 foreign policy experts,"'1 and commentators" 2 have argued
that the three premises underlying the checks-and-balances stan-
dard are not relevant in the modern world.
Though the consequences of war are immeasurably graver to-
day than in 1787, the advocates of the abolition of checks and bal-
ances often appear indifferent to the potential casualties of modern
warfare. For example, during the Cuban missile crisis President
Kennedy stated that he found 150,000,000 American deaths an ac-
ceptable level of casualties." 3 Second, proponents of broad presi-
"0 See United States Commitments to Foreign Powers, Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 108, 140-54 (1967) (statement of
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Undersecretary of State to President Johnson) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on U.S. Commitments Abroad]; 1966 State Dep't Memo, supra note 4, at 484
(President has very broad powers enabling him to deploy American forces abroad when he
deems it necessary to maintain the security and defense of the United States); Rogers, Con-
gress, the President, and the War Powers, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1194, 1207-12 (1971) (recogniz-
ing fundamental historical changes in the world which must be considered in defining war
powers); Rostow, supra note 2, at 900 (arguing that a tense and unstable world requires that
the President possess the power to take immediate and flexible military action in order to
preserve the peace).
11 See Fulbright, supra note 91, at 7 (questioning the adequacy of the "18th-century"
Constitution in shaping foreign policy in a dynamic 20th century); Goldwater, The Presi-
dent's Ability to Protect America's Freedoms-The Warmaking Powers, 1971 LAW & Soc.
ORD. 423, 444-45 (the President has the right to take military actions which he believes
necessary without being restrained by Congress); Goldwater, The President's Constitutional
Primacy in Foreign Relations and National Defense, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 463, 464-67 (1973)
(the President must have some degree of independence in foreign affairs).
"I G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 14-26, 32-
35 (1971) (a process endorsed by foreign policy scholars as the best method for deciding
foreign policy and defense issues is that the government act as a rational, unitary deci-
sionmaker); A. SCHLESINGRE, supra note 3, at 166, 169-70; J. SPANIER & E. USLANER, How
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY Is MADE 54-62, 68-78, 132-51 (1978).
112 Cf. Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International
Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345, 359-65 (1955) (the President can use his warmaking powers
when the interests of the United States so require); Monaghan, Presidential War-Making,
50 B.U.L. REV. 19, 33 (1970) (the apparently unlimited powers exercised by the President in
the Vietnam "war" were not unconstitutional); Ratner, supra note 2, at 467 (in modern
world, President must be given power to defend allies who have been attacked). See gener-
ally R. HIRSCHFIELD, THE PowER OF THE PRESIDENCY 206 (1968); L. KOENIG, THE CHIEF Ex-
ECUTIVE 240 (1981).
113 In his address announcing the decision that the United States Government would
seek to compel the Soviet Union to withdraw its nuclear missiles from Cuba, President Ken-
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dential power assert that the decision to go to war is objectively
determined by the international environment. Thus, the argument
is made that if the President is informed as to international real-
ity, then he alone can decide when war is necessary.114 Finally,
presidential power advocates assert that the members of Congress
invariably lack the requisite information, expertise, and judgment
to render a sound warmaking decision,11 5 and that Congress as an
institution is too slow and inflexible to make effective and timely
determinations in a world of nuclear arms and other powerful,
fast-moving weapons."1 " It can be demonstrated, however, that the
cited objections are palpably inaccurate, and that the three-pre-
mise theory is still relevant, indeed essential, in today's world.
A. Premise One: War Is Infinitely More Dangerous in the Mod-
ern World Than in the World of the Framers
War is immeasurably more dangerous in the modern world
than in the world of the Framers, and thus the first premise is as
relevant today as it ever was. The number of casualties in any con-
temporary war-whether conventional 117 or nuclear"'-can range
nedy acknowledged that his policy could result in an all-out nuclear war. In his October 22,
1962 address to the nation, the President stated: "We will not prematurely or unnecessarily
risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in
our mouth-but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced." R.
KENNEDY, supra note 65, at 156. The President estimated the probability of a nuclear war
occurring as "between one out of three and even." T. SORENSEN, KENNEDY 705 (1965).
114 See J. SPANIER, supra note 73, at 60, 385-87. It has been asserted that the interna-
tional system fixes the behavior of a nation. Id. at 60. The President and Congress do not
have a choice in deciding that war should be initiated, since the international environment
requires the United States to fight. Thus, the argument goes, since the decision to go to war
is objectively determined by the external reality, every American leader would reach the
same conclusion as to whether a war should be fought. Id. at 60, 385. Hence, the President
need only be adequately informed as to the needs of the United States in order to utilize the
power to make war correctly. Id. at 385-87. But see B. BRODIE, supra note 8, at 343-45
(arguing against the theory that the decision to initiate war is objectively determined and
universally accepted).
"' See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 14.
Jl . SPANIER & E. USLANER, supra note 111, at 138. When confronted with a crisis
situation, it is argued, Congress necessarily will be bypassed because of the need for a rapid
decision in order to prevent further complications. Id. During the Cuban missile crisis, Pres-
ident Kennedy perceived a blockade as the proper course of action. His idea was to start low
on the "escalation ladder" and control the movement upward so as to give the opponent
sufficient time to weigh the risks and costs and thus prevent nuclear war. Id. at 139; see
infra note 188. The President stated that "[t]hese steps must be carefully timed, coordi-
nated, and calculated, for the risks of miscalculation are ever present." J. SPANIER & E.
USLANER, supra note 111, at 139.
117 Modem weapons are highly destructive, exceptionally mobile, and of great range. W.
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from high to catastrophic.11 What is intended as a minor war
against a relatively weak nation may result in a major war against
an able, determined enemy. 120 Vietnam provides a vivid illustra-
tion. The small, technologically primitive nation of North Vietnam,
a nation without an air force and with ground forces woefully in-
ferior to the United States Army, inflicted over three hundred
thousand casualties on American forces.121 Since the Soviet Union
KOENIG, WEAPONS OF WORLD WAR III 24 (1981); J. SPANIER, supra note 73, at 117-19. This is
exemplified by the 1941 German attack on the Soviet Union. J. SPANIER, supra note 73, at
116-19. It is estimated that the Soviets suffered "at least three million" casualties during the
first 3 months alone. P. CALVOCORESSI & G. WiNT, TOTAL WAR 183 (1972). Adding the one
million German casualties to this figure indicates a total of four million dead or wounded
during the first 3 months of that campaign. Id. at 182.
Since today's weapons are swifter and more powerful and accurate than those of World
War II, Ginsburgh, The United States Air Force, in THE U.S. WAR MACHINE 150 (1978); see
L. MARTIN, ARMS AND STRATEGY 61 (1973), it can reasonably be stated that the casualties
produced by an all-out conventional war today, such as a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict,
would easily surpass those of 40 years ago, see H. OWEN & C. SCHULTZE, SETrING NATIONAL
PRIORITIES 67 (1976).
118 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
11 It is impossible to predict with certainty whether a particular use of the armed
forces in a noncombat situation will culminate in war. B. BLEcKMAN & S. KAPLAN, supra
note 65, at 230; H. KAHN, ON ESCALATION 9-13 (1965); Note, supra note 8, at 1795. Deter-
rence strategists advocate using the armed forces in situations short of fighting, such as the
deployment of ground forces into a troubled nation, a naval show of force, or airlifting per-
sons and equipment across disputed and hostile territory. It is argued that this will demon-
strate that the United States is prepared and willing to go to war to defend an ally, A.
GEORGE & R. SMOKE, supra note 65, at 58-60, and thereby lead a potential aggressor to
conclude that the benefits to be derived from contemplated aggression are now outweighed
by its costs, id. at 97-103. If this favorable outcome results, then it is said that the American
military action has deterred the outbreak of war. Id.
The American military move, however, might not result in the prevention of war, but
rather may lead to its outbreak. Note, supra note 8, at 1795. Furthermore, assuming there is
an outbreak of war, there is the difficulty of limiting the casualties and duration of the
conflict. R. LECKIE, supra note 35, at 853; Reveley, supra note 7, at 1288-89; Note, supra
note 8, at 1796. One commentator observes that in the modern world "it can no longer be
said with any degree of assurance that the commitment of troops to combat under any
conditions is unlikely to result in major conflict." Note, supra note 8, at 1796 (emphasis in
original). Also, Professor Reveley concludes: "In any use of force today, unlike the nine-
teenth century, it is difficult to predict the ultimate price. What is initially intended to be a
minor effort, perhaps involving only a bloodless show of force, can easily grow into a major
war, even a nuclear one." Reveley, supra note 7, at 1288-89.
120 President Truman intended the American commitment to Korea to be small and of
short duration, with minimal American casualties. R. LECKIE, supra note 35, at 850-58.
Moreover, the United States ruefully underestimated the ability and determination of the
Vietnamese Communists. Note, supra note 8, at 1796.
"I American military superiority forced the Vietnamese Communists to resort to guer-
rilla warfare. See R. LECKIE, supra note 35, at 943-44. The Communist forces were weaker,
poorly equipped and fewer in number relative to the American and South Vietnamese
forces. See id. at 972-73. Despite having a relatively weaker military, the Communist regime
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and other technologically advanced nations have provided Third
World countries with powerful weapons, even the most backward
nation in the world is capable of killing tens of thousands of Amer-
icans.122 Furthermore, an even greater risk than the danger of a
relatively weak nation using its own military forces to inflict mas-
sive casualties on American troops is the ever-present possibility of
such a nation becoming allied with the Soviet Union.123 Such inter-
vention would present the prospect of Soviet conventional and nu-
clear forces being employed against American soldiers and civil-
ians. For example, during the October 1973 war, Egypt sought and
received a Soviet commitment that the U.S.S.R. would use Soviet
conventional and nuclear power to preserve the cease-fire and to
save the encircled Egyptian Third Army, even though Egypt's alli-
ance with the Soviet Union was tenuous at the time.124 President
killed 58,000 Americans. NEWSW EK, Dec. 27, 1982, at 38.
122 The Soviet Union has supplied modern weapons to such Third World countries as
India, Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, Cuba and Guinea. J. SPANIER, supra note 73, at
448-49; see Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Middle East Empire in EXPANSION &
DETENTE 264-68 (W. Griffith ed. 1976). If the United States were to enter into a conflict with
one of these lesser-developed nations, American forces doubtlessly would be confronted with
some of the most modern weapon systems. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., THE MID-
DLE EAST 47-49 (5th ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as MMDLE EAST].
123 Soviet intervention on behalf of Third World nations has not been limited to treaty
allies or Communist regimes. For example, the non-Communist government of Egypt had
neither signed a mutual defense treaty, granted base rights to the Soviet military, nor other-
wise aided Soviet military policy when the Soviet Union threatened to use its forces on
behalf of Egypt during the 1956 Suez crisis. See A. GEORGE & R. SMOKE, supra note 65, at
319; W. LAFEBER, supra note 71, at 192; A. ULAM, THE RvALs 257-58 (1971). On October 29,
1956, Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula and quickly routed the Egyptian Army. W.
LAFEBER, supra note 71, at 191. The next day, the British and French began the attack on
the Suez Canal. Id. The air attacks were followed by an Anglo-French landing on November
4. A. ULAM, supra, at 257. At this juncture, the Soviets threatened to send troops to aid
Egypt and to attack Britain and France with nuclear weapons. R. FERRELL, supra note 8, at
746. Seventeen years later, the Soviet Union again threatened to use its military power on
behalf of a non-Communist, nonallied nation. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying
text.
24 Anwar el-Sadat succeeded Gamel Abdel Nasser in 1970, and shortly thereafter
Egyptian-Soviet relations began to deteriorate. MDDLE EAST, supra note 122, at 75. Presi-
dent Sadat became increasingly disillusioned with the Soviet Union. H. KISSINGER, WHrrE
HousE YEARS 1276 (1979). On July 18, 1972, Sadat ordered more than 15,000 Soviet military
advisers out of Egypt. Id. at 1295. In addition, the Soviet bases and equipment set up in
Egypt were to become Egyptian property. Id. Despite this discord, the Soviet Union was
prepared to employ its military power on behalf of Egypt during the October 1973 war. See
M. KALB & B. KALB, supra note 65, at 489-92; R. NIXON, THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON
938-40 (1978).
In that war, the Israelis encircled the best fighting force in the Egyptian Army, the
Third Army. M. KALB & B. KALB, supra note 65, at 489-92. Cut off from any resupply, the
Third Army was at the mercy of the Israelis. Id. Sadat feared that the cream of the Egyp-
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Nixon, who had decided to counter any Soviet intervention with
the deployment of American conventional forces and the threat of
striking the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons, recognized that
his decision to use American military power might have led to a
nuclear holocaust.12 5 In his memoirs, the President states: "We
neared the brink of nuclear war.' 2 6
The prospect of nuclear war is both real and substantial. It is
most likely to occur through a process of unintended and un-
wanted escalation during a conventional war or superpower cri-
sis. 127 While this has not occurred to date, success at a lottery in
the past is no guarantee of success in the future.' American Pres-
tian Army would be destroyed and his regime overthrown. Id. at 490. When the October 24
cease-fire went into effect, Sadat urgently appealed to Brezhnev and Nixon to send a joint
Soviet-American peacekeeping force to the Middle East to ensure compliance with the
cease-fire. Id. at 489. The Soviets accepted the Sadat proposal, while the United States
opposed a joint Soviet-American peacekeeping force. Id.
125 A message sent by Premier Brezhnev to President Nixon was characterized by the
President as representing "the most serious threat to U.S.-Soviet relations since the Cuban
missile crisis eleven years before." R. NIXON, supra note 124, at 938. Brezhnev charged that
Israel was in violation of the cease-fire. Therefore, he urged the United States to join the
Soviet Union in dispatching military forces into the Middle East to enforce the cease-fire.
Id. The Soviet leader coupled his request for joint action with a threat of unilateral Soviet
intervention if the United States failed to comply. Id.
President Nixon reiterated his opposition to joint action and, as part of a strategy to
deter the Soviets from sending forces to rescue the encircled Egyptian Third Army, in-
creased the alert status of all American conventional and nuclear forces. M. KALB & B.
KALB, supra note 65, at 492. In addition, Nixon sent a letter to Brezhnev in which he called
the Soviet plan for unilateral military action "a matter of the gravest concern" and implied
that it would be opposed by American military forces, including nuclear weapons. R. NIXON,
supra note 124, at 939. These actions were taken during the night of October 24. Id. The
Nixon counter-threat substantially increased the probability of a confrontation between
American and Soviet forces.
126 R. NIXON, supra note 124, at 922. The crisis ended in the late morning of October
25, when the Soviet Union agreed to an American peacekeeping proposal. The proposal spe-
cifically excluded the forces of the two superpowers, but called for the United Nations to
send a force to supervise the cease-fire. M. KALB & B. KALB, supra note 65, at 496.
11 See H. KAHN, supra note 119, at 3-15, 74-82; J. SPANiER, supra note 73, at 170-71; T.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 190-91 (1960). It has been American policy to run
the risk of escalation to nuclear war in order to win a superpower crisis or conventional war.
See infra note 129. President Nixon exploited the Soviet fear of nuclear war during the
October 1973 crisis, see supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text, and President Kennedy
employed the risk of escalation during the Cuban missile crisis. See infra note 131. In addi-
tion, the present NATO strategy requires the United States to use nuclear weapons in order
to prevent the defeat of European allies in a conventional war. B. BRODIE, supra note 8, at
399-405.
128 Kenneth Boulding has developed a very useful visual image of nuclear risk-taking
during a superpower crisis. The crisis situation may be dramatized by conceptualizing it as
"a bag containing one black ball amid many white balls ... ." K. BOULDING, THE MEANING
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idents from Harry Truman through Ronald Reagan have recog-
nized that although Soviet nuclear forces assuredly could destroy
the United States, American nuclear forces likewise could destroy
the Soviet Union, and thus, American Presidents have employed
the threat of nuclear war to influence the behavior of Soviet lead-
ers during various crises.1 29 While the probability is virtually nil
that an American President who is in control of events would
choose to implement the threat,130 world history in general and the
much briefer history of nuclear brinksmanship indicate the ever-
present danger that events may elude the control of the super-
power leaders and consequently, the threat may escalate into a nu-
clear war intended by no one.13'
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 91 (1964). The black ball is nuclear war. When the leaders of
the two superpowers engage in nuclear risk-taking, they must dip their hands into the bag.
Up to now, the leaders have always drawn a white ball; and the world goes smugly on. But
the possibility of nuclear warfare, represented by the black ball, is always present. Herman
Kahn concludes: "[W]hen one competes in risk-taking, one is taking risks. If one takes risks,
one may be unlucky and lose the gamble." H. KAHN, supra note 119, at 15.
129 J. KAHAN, SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 14-15, 18-25, 78-79, 80-84 (1975); M. KALB
& B. KALB, supra note 65, at 484-99; J. SPANIER, supra note 73, at 121-24, 146-56. Professor
Gilpin correctly observes that "[a] major and disturbing consequence of the advent of [nu-
clear] weapons ... is that they have enhanced the threat of war as an instrument of pol-
icy." R. GILPIN, supra note 18, at 214.
130 See J. SPANIER, supra note 73, at 118-20. President Eisenhower recognized that if
the United States ever initiated a nuclear strike against the U.S.S.R., the Soviets would
certainly retaliate and annihilate the United States. See J. KAHAN, supra note 129, at 15.
1M1 As long ago as the 5th century B.C., it was recognized that in time of war, risk of
miscalculation is high and an initial limited move can escalate inexorably into a much more
violent conflict than any adversary desired. R. GILPIN, supra note 18, at 200-02. One com-
mentator noted that as war continues, it generally becomes an affair of chance for both
sides. Id. at 202. Moreover, many historians and political scientists believe that World War I
resulted from a competition in risk-taking in which experienced and able statesmen of the
European powers lost control over events. See generally B. TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST
71-97 (1962).
Scholars and statesmen have recognized that whenever the United States issues a nu-
clear threat, or takes or threatens a highly provocative conventional action, the Soviet
Union might not back down as it did during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the 1973
Middle East war, but instead issue a counter-threat. Then, from a process that is not en-
tirely foreseeable, from reactions that are not fully predictable, and from decisions that are
not wholly deliberate, that threat might be implemented. See T. SCHELLING, ARMS AND IN-
FLUENCE 98 (1966). During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy was aware of and
concerned about nuclear war erupting inadvertently either by a mistaken interpretation of
enemy intent or by an irreversible series of limited moves on each side. J. KAHAN, supra
note 129, at 81. See generally H. KAHN, supra note 119, at 9-15. For example, if Khrushchev
would have reached the conclusion that the United States was preparing to launch a nuclear
attack against the Soviet Union, then he might have decided to attack first in order to
prevent the American strike from destroying his missiles. See G. ALLISON, supra note 111, at
141, 213. While President Kennedy had made no such plans or preparations to attack Soviet
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B. Premise Two: An Erroneous Decision to Commence War is
More Likely with a Foreign Policy of Indiscriminate Global
Containment
Proponents of broad presidential power assert that the deci-
sion to go to war is objectively determined and universally ac-
cepted. More specifically, they argue that the international envi-
ronment compels every American decisionmaker to conclude, in
certain situations, that war is the correct policy choice. Since the
decision is objectively fixed by international reality, it is argued
that if the President is adequately informed as to the needs of the
United States, then he alone can correctly make the decision to go
to war. For example, it was contended that any reasonable man
who was aware of the requirements of the global balance of power
would have to conclude that the United States had to fight in
Vietnam.1 3 2
The Framers of the Constitution, however, clearly held a dia-
metrically opposed view. They knew that the decision as to the
scope of the national interest is neither objective nor capable of
universal acceptance. Even if Congress accepted a presidential def-
inition of the extent of national interest, the drafters' logic ran,
Congress nevertheless could conclude that the national interests at
stake were not worth the costs of war."3"
territory, Khrushchev had no way of knowing this and, in interpreting American intent,
might have accepted as real what were only suspicions and fears. See H. KAHN, supra note
119, at 10. When an American U-2 plane accidentally wandered into Soviet airspace,
Khrushchev interpreted the presence of the American plane as an American reconnaissance
plane whose mission was to survey targets in the Soviet Union in preparation for an immi-
nent American nuclear attack. G. ALLISON, supra note 111, at 141. This interpretation, com-
bined with the amassing of an invasion force in Florida and an unauthorized leak from the
State Department threatening "further action" if work continued on the Cuban missile ba-
ses, nearly prompted Khrushchev to launch a Soviet preemptive strike. Id. at 47-48, 64-66.
In addition to miscalculation, a series of limited conventional moves may compel re-
sponses until the nuclear rung on the escalation ladder is reached and crossed. G. ALLISON,
supra note 111, at 56-62. President Kennedy predicted that an American airstrike or inva-
sion of Cuba would have killed many Soviets and thus forced Khrushchev to have made his
own nonnuclear move. "If they don't take action in Cuba, they certainly will in Berlin," the
President stated. R. KENNEDY, supra note 65, at 14-15, 98. Thus, after the first round, the
United States would have won in Cuba, and the Soviet Union would have used its conven-
tional superiority around Berlin to succeed there. The scenario thus leads to the question
whether the confrontation would have ended after each side employed its conventional
power, or proceeded to all-out nuclear conflict. See generally R. GILPIN, supra note 18, at
214; Shribman, Experts Fear That Unpredictable Chain of Events Could Bring Nuclear
War, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1982, at A10, col. 1.
132 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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More significantly, the logic employed by the advocates of un-
bridled presidential initiative generally has been refuted by his-
tory. Pre-Korean war Congresses and Presidents did not wage war
unless and until agreement was reached on the definition of the
scope of national interest and the determination that the benefits
to be derived from the war outweighed its costs.134 It is specious to
contend that such decisions were clear-cut and without contro-
versy. From 1945 to 1950, for example, Western Europe lay rav-
aged as a result of 6 years of total war, and was completely vulner-
able to the victorious and powerful Red Army.135 The loss of
Western Europe to the Soviet Union would have impaired signifi-
cantly three fundamental interests of the United States: the bal-
ance of power, since one nation would be in complete control of
Europe; the territorial integrity of the United States, in that the
Soviet Union could then or at some future time attack the United
States; and trade, in that a market for American products and a
source of American imports would be lost.'36 Yet, despite the ur-
gency and magnitude of this Soviet threat to the most vital of
American interests, no commitment to defend Western Europe was
made prior to securing legislative authorization. 137
Moreover, if legislative authorization could not be assumed in
the case of protecting intrinsically important nations against a ma-
jor and unambiguous Soviet threat, then, a fortiori, legislative au-
thorization cannot be assumed in the case of defending an unim-
portant nation against more minor and ambiguous aggression in
which the harm to the interests of the United States is unlikely,
remote, and speculative. 38 South Korea was in the latter category,
See supra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
See id.
137 See id.
"' See B. BRODIE, supra note 8, at 355, 358-59. See generally A. SCHLESINGER, THE
BrrrER HERrrAGE 117-26 (1966). The futility of practicing global containment by committing
American forces to areas of minor United States interest is evidenced by the recent conflict
in Vietnam. Schlesinger contends that the presidential judgment had been warped by abso-
lute, unlimited, and unchecked power to make war. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 183-84.
It is indisputable that throughout the last 32 years, Presidents have made some misguided
determinations that the national interest at stake was sufficiently important and threatened
that war was necessary and wise.
The result was a policy of indiscriminate global intervention which has neither ad-
vanced nor strengthened the national interest. Instead, it has weakened the nation's security
by involving the United States in remote, dangerous, and potentially cataclysmic confronta-
tions and wars. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 168-69. Moreover, while the United States
has devoted its attention, resources and blood to marginal problems in peripheral areas, the
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strategically' 9 and economically valueless. 140 In fact, before the
outbreak of the Korean war, Truman and his advisers calculated
American interests in Korea and concluded that in the event of a
North Korean attack, the best policy for the United States was
neutrality."" Moreover, Congress had considered this contingency
American commitment to the parts of the world which are truly vital to the national interest
has been neglected. See A. SCHLESINGER, supra, at 142-43.
Two eminent scholars of international relations, Alexander George and Richard Smoke,
identified and criticized the false premises and fallacious logic that the Presidents of the
1950's and 1960's employed, stating that "the Cold War had been dominated by a belief in
the necessary indivisibility of issues, with everything somehow connected with everything
else. .. ." A. GEORGE & R. SMOKE, supra note 65, at 598 (emphasis added). The advocates
of containment perceived the Soviet ruler as possessing an almost compulsive desire for
expansion in order to enhance Soviet influence and ultimately bring the rest of the world
under Soviet hegemony. The Soviet Union was viewed as the head of an international Com-
munist movement, designed to upset the status quo or exploit any takeover by a reformist
or revolutionary group. The perception of the Soviet rulers as malevolently and ruthlessly
efficient gradually has given way, however, as the Soviet Union exhibits caution and a lack
of success in expanding its influence. Moreover, the beneficiaries of Soviet economic and
military aid display an unexpected independence of their benefactors. Id. at 597.
139 See R. LECKIE, supra note 35, at 849 (Secretary of State Acheson and Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Connally commented that Korea was unimportant
to the defense of American territory or to the balance of power); E. MAY, supra note 75, at
58-62. During successive careful and high-level deliberations over a 2-year period before the
North Korean invasion, there was "'fairly unanimous agreement to abandon the Koreans to
their fate,' the grounds being 'that Southern Korea is without strategic value to us, is, in
fact, a strategic liability ...."' Id. at 59.
140 See R. LECKIE, supra note 35, at 846-47. In 1945, the Soviet Union occupied north-
ern Korea and established the 38th parallel as the demarcation line between the industrial
north and the agricultural south. Id. The Soviets then isolated the south by shutting off
electric power and cutting off railroad access. Id. at 847. Trade between the two halves of
the country became nonexistent. Id. The south lacked coal and chemicals and suffered from
spiraling inflation. Id.
141 E. MAY, supra note 75, at 59-67. Whenever "American officials reflected . . . upon
the possibility of North Korean aggression, they apparently took it as a foregone conclusion
that the United States should not and would not resist with force." Id. at 64. Moreover,
Professor May states:
It was the policy of the United States in June 1950 to avoid using American
military forces in Korea. This had been the consistent position of the Joint Chiefs,
twice considered by the National Security Council, and on both occasions ap-
proved by the President . . . . [T]he government can be said to have coolly as-
sessed the national interest and decided what decision ought to be made in the
event of a [North Korean attack] ....
Id. at 67.
Presently, an analogous situation exists in El Salvador. See The Peekaboo Offensive,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15, 1982, at 35. Although the United States continues to supply military
and economic aid to El Salvador, former Secretary of State Haig denied any intention of
sending United States ground troops to the Central American nation. Id. at 36. The distinct
possibility, however, that Reagan will send troops should the Salvadoran Government falter
is evident. Id.
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and was firmly behind the policy of nonintervention in the Korean
civil war.142 Yet, the decision was made to intervene. 143
In a world where any commitment of American military forces
may lead to a major war or even to nuclear holocaust, a require-
ment of congressional authorization is necessary to prevent the
President from unnecessarily endangering the lives of American
troops and civilians. Since any President who adopts a foreign pol-
icy of indiscriminate global containment perceives a virtually limit-
less range of threats to the national interest,"44 there is a very high
probability that a decision will be made to intervene in a foreign
conflict which has only a slight, indirect, or illusory effect on the
defense of American territory, the balance of power, and American
economic interests. This foreign policy of limitless containment,
combined with the destructiveness of modern weapons, may result
in American Presidents risking survival of the state and countless
American lives, for interests that, by comparison, are trivial.1
45
Thus, congressional participation is required now more than at
142 See E. MAY, supra note 75, at 66-67.
243 Id. at 69, 81-82. "'Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and
the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier .... If this was allowed to go
unchallenged,"' President Truman concluded, "'it would mean a third world war, just as
similar incidents had brought on a second world war."' Id. at 81-82 (quoting 2 H. TRUMAN,
MEMOIRS 332-33 (1955)). Again and again throughout the post-Korean period of global and
indiscriminate containment, the lesson of Munich was cited as the authority for interpreting
events and determining American policies. B. BRODIE, supra note 8, at 70, 118, 351, 353, 432.
The notorious "domino theory" was based on the Munich analogy. Id. at 144-53. Every
commitment of American forces during the last 32 years was based, at least in part, on the
notion that Soviet foreign policy goals and methods were identical with Nazi ambitions and
techniques. For example, former Secretary of State Haig asserted that the war in El Salva-
dor is not really a civil war, but only the latest move in "worldwide Soviet interventionism."
Isaacson, A Lot of Show But No Tell, TnmE, Mar. 22, 1982, at 18.
' See B. BRODIE, supra note 8, at 344, 350; J. SPANIER, supra note 73, at 216. It should
be stated that the Constitution permits the adoption of any foreign policy, including indis-
criminate global containment. Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to de-
clare war, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 11, while article II makes the President the Com-
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy and bestows on him the power to make treaties with
the advice and consent of the Senate, id., art. II, § 2, cls. 1-2. No specific foreign policy is
mentioned in, much less mandated by the Constitution. While the Constitution permits the
adoption of any foreign policy, the President "shall take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3. It follows that, if the President chooses a policy of global
containment, the means by which he implements that policy must be consistent with, and
faithful to, the laws passed by Congress and the Constitution itself.
'" B. BRODIE, supra note 8, at 344, 350; A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 168-70, 183-
86, 273-75, 288-89; J. SPANiER, supra note 73, at 216; cf. NATIONAL COMMITMENTS REPORT,
supra note 9, at 26 ("Congress has permitted its war power to be transferred to the hands of
an executive which, though less susceptible to self-doubt than the Congress, is no less sus-
ceptible to error").
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anytime in our history.1 46
C. Premise Three: Congressional Participation in the War-Com-
mencing Procedure Can Reduce the Probability of an Erroneous
Decision
Proponents of presidential power have asserted that congres-
sional participation in the war-commencing process would not
make a positive contribution, but would only burden the process
with error and delay.147 It is submitted that this criticism, that
members of Congress lack sufficient information, expertise, and
judgment to define the national interest and determine whether
the national interests at stake justify the dangerous risks of mod-
ern war, 148 is meritless. Although some Presidents and their. advis-
ers may be more experienced and educated in foreign affairs than
some members of Congress, a comparison of the knowledge and
skill of Senators and Representatives with Presidents and their ad-
visers reveals that executive branch individuals are in no better po-
sition to make such decisions than members of Congress.1 49 If ei-
ther branch contains more informed and experienced members, it
is probably the Congress. Senators and Congressmen who are on
the Foreign Relations or Armed Services Committee, for example,
presumably have had more extensive involvement in analysis of
American interests and commitments than the more transient
Presidents and their advisers.1 50 Legislative participation in fact
will reduce the probability of engaging in an unnecessary war by
playing the role of a constructive adversary. 51 Congress can pre-
141 See supra notes 133-45 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
145 See supra text accompanying note 115.
149 A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 282-84, 326, 452 n.94.
150 In 1974, the executive branch was headed by Gerald Ford who had never held any
foreign affairs position. In contrast, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was comprised
of many experienced foreign policy decisionmakers, namely Senators Fulbright, Mansfield,
Church, Symington, McGovern, Muskie, Humphrey, Case, Javits and Percy. A. ScHm.s-
INGER, supra note 3, at 452 n.94.
181 R. DAHL, CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY 104 (1950); Reveley, supra note 7, at 1295.
Professor Reveley states: "The determination that military action is in our national interests
requires the setting of priorities in light of existing values." Reveley, supra note 7, at 1295.
Congress is certainly as able as the executive branch to make that decision. Id. Political
scientist Robert Dahl observes that in deciding what elements to include in national interest
and whether the national interest is worth war, legislators are as qualified as tle President
and his advisers. According to Dahl, "[t]he more important the questions of preference be-
come, the less competent becomes the expert .... [A]t the top of the pyramid, the skills of
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vent the President from defining the national interest overbroadly
or from reaching an erroneous determination as to whether the
gains to be derived from a military involvement exceed the costs.152
Moreover, Congress is in a better position than the President to
gauge the willingness of the American people to suffer the misery
of war.153 In conclusion, Congress can reduce the probability of
fighting an unnecessary war by scrutinizing presidential policy and
by ensuring the representation of public sentiment in the warmak-
ing decision. 5 4
an Acheson [former Secretary of State] and a Vandenberg [former Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee] may be of much the same kind." R. DAHL, supra, at 104.
Dahl speaks of "bring[ing] the highest competence of the entire skill group to bear upon the
making of policy." Id. (emphasis in original).
'52 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 613-14 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring); id. at 629-30 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 652-53 (Jackson, J.,
concurring); NATIONAL CoMMTMrENTs REPORT, supra note 9, at 7; T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND,
supra note 52, at 32. In Youngstown, Justice Frankfurter in a concurrence observed that the
American scheme of government lacks the power to act with complete, swiftly moving au-
thority. The price of this restriction, however, according to Justice Frankfurter, is out-
weighed by the safeguards it affords. Id. at 613-14 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). He cited
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), in which Justice
Brandeis stated that the doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Constitu-
tional Convention not to promote efficiency, but, through the inevitable friction among the
three branches of government, to prevent the establishment of autocracy. 343 U.S. at 613-14
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Senator William Fulbright noted that American policymakers, from Korea to Berlin to
Cuba to Vietnam, implemented a policy of containment based on assumptions that few re-
ally questioned. The premises of containment were never reexamined by the architects of
our foreign policy, nor were these premises subject to criticism in constructive adversary
proceedings. H. NASH, AmERIcAN FOREIGN POLICY: RESPONSE TO A SENSE OF THREAT 2 (1973).
Professor Bickel perceived the modern relevance and significance of preventing the
President from committing hasty and ill-conceived military moves by the check of congres-
sional questioning, constructive criticism, and creative initiative. He stated:
There is no assurance of wisdom in Congress, and no such assurance in the presi-
dency .... The only assurance there is lies in process, in the duty to explain,
justify and persuade, to define the national interest by evoking it, and thus to act
by consent ... Singly, either the President or Congress can fall into bad errors
.... So they can together, too, but that is somewhat less likely, and in any event,
together they are all we've got.
Bickel, The Need for a War-Powers Bill, New Republic, Jan. 22, 1972, at 18. Professor
Reveley conceded that "the mere process of articulating and debating goals and strategies
might lead all concerned to a fuller understanding of the interests and alternatives at
stake." Reveley, supra note 7, at 1301.
Berger, supra note 7, at 85; Note, supra note 8, at 1775.
128 CONG. REC. S1706-07 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1982) (statement of Sen. Byrd); Berger,
supra note 7, at 84; Reveley, supra note 7, at 1295; see Roberts, A Majority in Poll Want
U.S. to Stay Out of Salvador War, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1982, at 1, col. 2; Byrd Seeking to
Bar U.S. Combat Troops from Salvadoran War, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1982, at 17, col. 1. On
March 8, 1982, Senator Robert Byrd, the leader of the Democratic Party in the Senate,
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VI. THE RESTORATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
A. The War Powers Resolution: The Failed Attempt to Restore
Checks and Balances
The Vietnam war caused many legislators to reexamine cold
war assumptions concerning the respective roles of Congress and
the President in committing American military forces abroad. 155
Between 1969 and 1973, Congress considered various bills that
sought to reverse presidential usurpation and restore checks and
balances.15 6 In the fall of 1973, the War Powers Resolution became
law. 157
The resolution is a hybrid of two different concepts of limiting
presidential power."" The House bill required the President to ter-
minate hostilities automatically by the end of a given period unless
Congress had declared a war or otherwise authorized the use of the
military,15 9 and permitted Congress to terminate hostilities at any
announced that he would introduce legislation which would bar the President from ordering
combat troops to El Salvador without seeking a prior statutory authorization from Congress.
The bill, an amendment to the War Powers Resolution of 1973, would restore constitutional
procedures at least in regard to the decision to fight in El Salvador. Byrd Seeking to Bar
U.S. Combat Troops from Salvadoran War, supra, at 17, col. 1.
1'5 W. REVELEY, supra note 3, at 225; Spong, The War Powers Resolution Revisited:
Historic Accomplishment or Surrender?, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 823-24 (1975); see
Firmage, The War Powers and the Political Question Doctrine, 49 U. COLO. L. REv. 65, 89-
90 (1977). Professor Berger criticized the extension of presidential warmaking power:
Through presidential conduct of foreign policy, . . . we have become entan-
gled in a succession of great wars. If we are to forfend such catastrophes we must
begin by demanding to be consulted-for example, does the nation want to risk a
confrontation with the Soviet Union to halt its expansion into Africa? Perhaps it
should, but the decision cannot be left to Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Ford. Too many
calamitous executive decisions counsel against making them the sole and secret
arbiters of foreign policy.
Berger, The Tug-of-War Between Congress and the Presidency-Foreign Policy and the
Power to Make War, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 8 (1976).
1" Spong, supra note 155, at 824.
167 Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-
1548 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
158 Spong, supra note 155, at 827-33. Compare S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2-5 (1973)
(Senate attempt to avoid unauthorized presidential wars by defining scope of unilateral ex-
ecutive authority) and S. RE'. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4, 21-27 (1973) (report on
proposed bill attempting to delineate the circumstances for unilateral presidential war
power) with H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1973) (House proposal allotting Presi-
dent greater authority than Senate proposal, subject to subsequent congressional approval)
and H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2346, 2349-51 (providing for consultation between Congress and the President prior to
war); see infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
159 H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4b (1973); see Spong, supra note 155, at 829.
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time if a majority of the members in each house voted by concur-
rent resolution to end the war.16 0
In contrast to this "performance" test of the House, the Sen-
ate adopted an "authority" approach.161 The Senate war power
proposals sought to define the circumstances, such as attack
against American territory, armed forces, or citizens, under which
the President could commit the military to hostilities.6 2 In all
other circumstances, the President could not initiate war on his
own authority.183
Essentially the compromise bill which emerged from the joint
House-Senate conference committee embraces the House "per-
formance" test. 1 4 The resolution does not confine presidential
1"0 H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4c (1973). Concurrent resolutions neither
require the President's signature nor are affected by his veto. Spong, supra note 155, at 829
n.43. Such resolutions have been used to terminate hostilities in the past. Additionally, Con-
gress has incorporated these resolutions in subsequent legislation. See, e.g., Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 617, 75 Stat. 424, 444; The Lend Lease Act, ch. 11,
§ 3 (c), 55 Stat. 31, 32 (1941); Reorganization Act of 1939, ch. 36, § 5 (a), 53 Stat. 561, 562.
1"I Spong, supra note 155, at 832-33. The characterization of the House approach as
"performance test" and the Senate approach as "authority" is Senator Spong's. Id. It is
suggested that these labels are derived from the actual nature of the rights afforded the
President under the different bills. In the Senate bill the President is given specific situa-
tions under which he will have unilateral "authority" to commence war. See infra note 162
and accompanying text. In the House bill, the President is given unilateral authority to
initiate or to "perform" the initiation of war in almost every situation and executive power
is merely subject to later ratification or approval by Congress. See H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d
Cong., 1st Seas. § 4b (1973).
161 S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(1)-(4) (1973). Section 3 provides in pertinent part:
[T]he Armed Forces of the United States may be introduced in hostilities . . .
only-(1) to repel an armed attack upon the United States...; (2) to repel an
armed attack against the Armed Forces of the United States. . .; (3) to protect
. . . citizens and nationals from.. . any situation... involving a direct and im-
minent threat to [their] lives . . .; or (4) pursuant to specific statutory
authorization.
Id.
161 Id. § 3. The Bill limited the conditions under which the President has unilateral
authority to initiate war and reserved all other situations for congressional approval through
the use of the introductory phrase: "In the absence of a declaration of war by Congress." Id.
I" T. EAGLETON, supra note 1, at 206-25; T. FRANCK & E. WESBAND, supra note 52, at
68-71; see supra note 161 and accompanying text. The Senate approach of defining the
circumstances under which the President possesses the legal authority to commence military
operations was rejected by the conference committee. Spong, supra note 155, at 833. Al-
though the Representatives in the conference committee who rejected the Senate approach
permitted the language of the authority approach to remain in the bill, the authority lan-
guage was no longer in the legally binding portion of the bill. Thus, the authority section of
the law, section 2(c), places no legal limits on the President's power to commence war. Id. at
834-35, 837-41; T. EAGLETON, supra note 1, at 202-05.
The War Powers Resolution produced by the conference committee was approved by
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warmaking to the circumstances under which the Chief Executive
has authority under the Constitution,'6 5 but instead, effectively
permits Presidents to continue to claim and exercise an unlimited
warmaking power.166 The only limit placed upon the presidential
power is durational-the President must receive congressional au-
thorization within 60 days after the war begins 6 7 and he is obli-
the Senate by a majority of 75 to 20. 119 CONG. REc. 33, 569-70 (1973). The conference
report was approved in the House by a 238 to 123 vote. Id. at 873-74. Although President
Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution, H.R. Doc. No. 171, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2
(1973), Congress subsequently overrode the President's veto, Spong, supra note 155, at 836-
37. At least one commentator has noted that despite general congressional opposition to the
conference committee bill, many members voted to override the presidential veto because of
transient political considerations. Id. at 836; T. EAGLETON, supra note 1, at 214-15. The
Indo-China war, Watergate, and partisan politics influenced legislators more than the merits
of the law. Id.; T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 52, at 70.
105 See T. EAGLErON, supra note 1, at 203-05. Senator Eagleton voiced his views on the
possible results of congressional failure to adopt the "authority" approach. Id. The result of
this omission, Eagleton concluded, was that the War Powers Resolution would provide "a
legal basis for the President's broad claims of inherent power to initiate war." Id. at 203.
Moreover, Eagleton cautioned, the War Powers Resolution is a dangerous piece of legisla-
tion which could "effectively eliminate Congress' constitutional power to authorize war." Id.
at 204. Others have joined Eagleton's philosophy, attempting to restore constitutionalism to
the war-decision procedure by suggesting amendment of the War Powers Resolution. See,
e.g., Byrd Seeking to Bar U.S. Troops From Salvadoran War, supra note 154, at 17, col. 1.
"' See T. EAGLErON, supra note 1, at 213; Spong, supra note 155, at 841; supra note
165. Senator Eagleton stated: "What this bill says is that the President can send us to war
wherever and whenever he wants to .... Despite what has been written and said about it,
it does not limit the power of the President of the United States to wage war by himself.
Quite to the contrary. It attempts to emblazon into law, that unilateral decisionmaking pro-
cess." 119 CONG. REc. 36,177 (1973).
During the floor debate in the House, many representatives stated that the War Powers
Resolution failed to deprive the executive branch of the power it seized during the cold war,
and that the bill's failure to undo the usurpation permitted Presidents to continue to per-
petuate the unconstitutional practice. For example, Representative Green stated that "a
careful reading of the bill indicates . . . an expansion of Presidential warmaking power
* Thus, the net result could be absolutely no legislative constraint on the President's
claims to constitutional warmaking authority." 119 CONG. REC. 36,204 (1973). Further, Rep-
resentative Abzug said that the War Powers Resolution gives the President power that he
did not already have under the Constitution. Id. at 36,221. She stressed that the resolution
gives the President "90 days in which to commit our forces anywhere in the world, only
requiring that he report to the Congress within 48 hours on what he has done." Id. Repre-
sentative Culver rebuked his colleagues of the 93d Congress for failing to annul the constitu-
tional procedure and to restore checks and balances, stressing that the resolution "[gives]
the President a blank check to wage war anywhere in the world for any reason of his choos-
ing for a period of 60 to 90 days." Id. Similarly, Representative Dellums observed that
"many Congressmen will live to see the mistake they made in allowing any President...
[this type of power]." Id. at 36,220.
67 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1976). Section 1544(b) provides:
Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submit-
ted pursuant to section 1543(a)(1) of this title, whichever is earlier, the President
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gated to end the war before the 60-day grace period expires in the
event that Congress passes a concurrent resolution ordering the
President to end hostilities."' 8 Thus, there is no restraint on the
initial presidential exercise of war power, and the War Powers Res-
olution does nothing to reverse the usurpation.169 The failure of
Congress to reclaim its rightful authority has left the unconstitu-
tional practice intact to the present day.170
shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such
report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has
declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States
Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically
unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-
day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the
President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable
military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires
the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt
removal of such forces.
Id.
Is$ Id. § 1544(c). Subsection (c) states:
Notwithstanding subsection (b) of this section, at any time that United States
Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States,
its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory
authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so
directs by concurrent resolution.
Id.
log Id. § 1541(c) (1976). Section 1541(c) provides:
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce
United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised
only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or
(3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories
or possessions, or its armed forces.
Id. The conference committee did not intend section 1541(c) to be mandatory, but only
precatory. T. EAGLErON, supra note 1, at 202-03; Spong, supra note 155, at 837-41. This
conclusion is derived from the conference report wherein it was stated that "[s]ubsequent
sections of the joint resolution are not dependent upon the language of [section 1541(c)]."
H.R. REP. No. 547, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973). The effect of this statement, Senator
Eagleton claims, not only diminishes the authority of section 1541(c), but "now, even its
value as a statement of policy... [is] questionable." T. EAGLETON, supra note 1, at 203.
After carefully analyzing the language of the law, the language in the House and Senate
bills, the legislative history, and principles of statutory construction, Senator Spong con-
cluded that section 2(c) is not mandatory and thus places no legal limits on the President's
power to commence war. Spong, supra note 155, at 840.
70 See 50 U.S.C. § 1547(d) (1976). Section 1547(d) states:
Nothing in this chapter-(I) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of
the Congress or of the President, or the provisions of existing treaties; or (2) shall
be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the intro-
duction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which author-
ity he would not have had in the absence of this chapter.
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B. Checks and Balances and Modern International Exigency
As this Article has demonstrated, the legitimate scope of inde-
pendent executive authority is quite narrow. At most, the Presi-
dent can act when American territory or American citizens are in
danger of attack.171 In all other circumstances the Constitution
does not permit a unilateral executive power and therefore prohib-
its the President from acting in these circumstances absent con-
gressional authorization. It has been argued that the application of
checks and balances to the war-commencing decision, although in-
disputably required by the Constitution, is misplaced in the post-
World War II world of highly destructive and swiftly moving con-
ventional and nuclear weapons. It is submitted, however, that the
restoration of checks and balances will not impair the ability of the
United States Government to protect itself or its vital interests.
Three factors-the development of a means of immediate mass de-
struction;17 a vehicle that can deliver this weapon between conti-
nents in a matter of minutes; 17 3 and the absence of effective de-
fenses' 74-all of which are fundamental changes in the technology
Id. Since Presidents had claimed broad power to make war for any reason of national inter-
est before the bill became law, section 1547(d) has been interpreted as permitting the con-
tinuation of that claim. See 119 CONG. REc. 36,204 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Green); id. at
36,189 (remarks of Sen. Eagleton); T. EAGLETON, supra note 1, at 202-03.
1 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. During the pre-Korean war period,
Presidents acquired the unilateral power to rescue American citizens who were in danger in
stateless territories and weak states. In the modern world, however, it appears that the Pres-
ident can never exercise the power to protect citizens in foreign territories, since there are
no longer any stateless territories or weak states. Whereas nations in which our citizens were
endangered in the past were too weak to inflict anything more than minimum casualties,
now, even the smaller nations of the world possess the military capability to inflict massive
casualties on American troops which land on their soil. See J. SPANMER, supra note 73, at
267-68. Second, in the past, nationalistic feelings were not as pronounced as they are today.
Currently, nation-states so value their sovereignty that they would regard the landing of
American troops to rescue American citizens as an invasion of their sovereign territory. See
id. at 114-15.
172 J. SPANIER, supra note 73, at 70-72; D. ZIEGLER, WAR, PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONs 343-44 (2d ed. 1981).
'73 Turner & Challener, Strategic and Political Implications of Missiles, in NATIONAL
SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 83-87 (1960). Professors Challener and Turner observed that
the
sharply increased velocity of. . . missiles . . . [is] causing military experts to re-
cast some of their most modern concepts of military policy and strategy.. . . The
advent of missiles has greatly intensified the compression of the time scale for
modern warfare.. .. [T]he United States, protected by oceans. . . [has] had to
adjust radically to the new situation.
Id. at 83-84.
7 Despite extensive research and development by both the United States and the So-
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of war, have led military strategists to conclude that since the
United States is vulnerable to complete destruction 175 American
strategy should not be to fight a nuclear war but to deter it.176
The strategy of deterrence requires the President to maintain
American nuclear forces in a permanent state of readiness so that
American missiles and bombers can retaliate immediately in the
event that the Soviets would launch a surprise nuclear attack. 177
According to deterrence strategy, if the President were able to or-
der an immediate, devastating retaliatory strike, then the Soviet
Union could be totally and assuredly destroyed. With this in mind
Soviet leaders will refrain from launching a nuclear attack against
the United States.
Conversely, if the President lacked the authority to order an
immediate retaliatory strike, the Soviet leaders might question the
ability and the willingness of the United States to retaliate effica-
ciously, and thus might be tempted to launch a first strike. 78 The
President, however, can order an immediate retaliatory strike
without exceeding the authority granted him under the Constitu-
tion. It is clear that the President has always possessed the author-
ity to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of
the United States from armed attack. 179 Thus, the invention of nu-
clear weapons and the changed strategic requirements of protect-
ing United States territory do not in fact require any modification
of traditional war-commencing procedure.
Opponents of a restoration of the checks-and-balances system
viet Union, neither nation has yet developed an effective antiballistic missile (ABM) system.
B. BRODIE, supra note 8, at 379; D. GOIPERT, M. MANDELBAUM, R. GARwIN & J. BARTON,
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WORLD POLrTIcs 34, 91 (1977); J. KAHAN, supra note 129, at 257-59.
"Knocking down an incoming missile with an interceptor vehicle is a complicated undertak-
ing .... President Kennedy described it as tantamount to hitting a bullet with another
bullet." D. GOMPERT, M. MANDELBAUM, R. GARWIN & J. BARTON, supra, at 34.
'7 J. SPANIER, supra note 73, at 124. With the advent of nuclear technology, "[n]uclear
weapons now ensure that any total war will risk the very substance of national life." Id.
'7 See J. SPANIER, supra note 73, at 124-30. See generally B. BRODIE, supra note 8, at
375-432; R. GILPIN, supra note 18, at 213-30.
177 See, e.g., J. KAHAN, supra note 129, at 35-47.
178 See J. SPANIER, supra note 73, at 124. It has been stated that "[tihe actual applica-
tion of force to beat the enemy [has been] replaced by the exploitation of potential force to
dissuade the potential aggressor from striking." Id. at 130 (emphasis in original).
179 See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text. Professor Henkin, an eminent au-
thority on the war powers, states: "In our day of instant war, all assume that the President
would have the power to retaliate against a nuclear attack, if only on the theory that retalia-
tion was a form of defense and might prevent or deter a... strike." L. HENKIN, supra note
1, at 52.
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to presidential war power also argue that improvements in conven-
tional weapon systems require the President to rely on a response
system which is speedier than legislative authorization in order to
mount an effective defense of an ally nation. An aggressor nation,
the argument is made, could conquer another nation with a devas-
tatingly swift attack.180 Once again, history belies this assertion.
While it is true that the development of artillery, tanks, and air-
craft has given an aggressor nation the capability to inflict the
same number of casualties in a week that would have taken a year
in 1787,181 it is also true that these weapons were invented and
utilized long before the cold war era.182 Yet, in the pre-cold war
era, no President ever claimed that the increased fire power and
mobility of foreign armies justified a commensurate increase in
presidential power. Again, reference is made to when Nazi Ger-
many launched a devastating blitzkrieg attack against France.
Within 1 month, Hitler's forces had routed the French forces18
and French Premier Reynaud appealed to President Roosevelt for
assistance in defending against the most rapidly moving attack
then known to mankind. President Roosevelt, however, regarded
the mobility and firepower with which German Armed Forces
could destroy the French as constitutionally immaterial, and re-
fused to commence war in the absence of congressional
authorization.1 8 4
Further, with respect to expeditious response, Congress pres-
ently can convene and legislate quite rapidly. Unlike Congresses of
50 or 150 years ago, the contemporary Congress is in session
throughout the year, and, even if the members of Congress are in
recess, modern transportation enables them to be present at the
Capitol in a matter of hours.1 85 Once assembled, Congress can au-
,S0 Ratner, supra note 2, at 466-67.
181 See generally R. GILPIN, supra note 18, at 62.
182 See generally id. One commentator notes that the development of modem tank war-
fare and tactical aircraft permitted a nation to employ a highly effective offense strategy by
1939-more than a decade before the Korean war. Id. at 62. Therefore, neither the increase
in our offensive capabilities nor those of our actual or potential foes should have an influ-
ence on the scope of unilateral executive power to initiate war. See infra notes 183-84 and
accompanying text.
s See W. SHIRER, supra note 48, at 738-39.
184 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
185 See W. REVEL.Y, supra note 3, at 162-63. Professor Reveley observes that in the
past there were many aspects of congressional procedure that prohibited speedy decision-
making. Id. He concedes, however, that "[tielephones and airplanes, in addition to briefer
recesses, now ensure the physical possibility of congressional influence during most crises."
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thorize war as quickly as a rollcall vote can be completed. For ex-
ample, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President
Roosevelt's request for a declaration of war was granted that same
day.186 Additionally, I day after President Eisenhower asked Con-
gress for authority to use American Armed Forces to protect Tai-
wan from attack by mainland China, 87 the Chairman of the House
Rules Committee called up the resolution under a closed rule per-
mitting only 2 hours of debate and no amendments. 8 8 The House
passed the resolution that same day.189 Three days thereafter, the
Senate approved what has become known as the Formosa resolu-
tion.9 0 Furthermore, despite executive assertions to the contrary,
there is abundant evidence that there was sufficient time for Presi-
dent Truman to seek congressional authorization before he unilat-
erally committed American forces to the defense of South Korea. 91
Thus, it is suggested, Congress can assemble and consider a war
resolution with sufficient speed for the United States to respond to
any attack anywhere in the world.' 92
Id. at 163.
'l R. Russell, supra note 40, at 370.
187 101 CONG. REc. 600-01, 625-26 (1955). For the historical, political and military
causes of the Taiwan Strait Crisis, see A. GEORGE & R. SMoKE, supra note 65, at 266-92. For
congressional debate on the Taiwan Strait Crisis, see 101 CONG. REc. 735-69, 813-52 (1955).
18 101 CONG. REC. 659 (1955).
18, R. Russell, supra note 40, at 410-13.
290 Id. at 680-81.
11 Reveley, supra note 7, at 1294; Note, supra note 8, at 1791. Professor Reveley ad-
mits that "in the Korean situation, congressional authorization could have been obtained
since Congress was in session and the legislators are capable of rapid action when con-
fronted with an act such as the North Korean invasion." Reveley, supra note 7, at 1294.
19 Historian Ruhl Bartlett contended:
The world, it is said, has moved in the space age where the weapons of destruction
are swifter and deadlier than ever before, where decisions on national defense may
need to be so immediate that no time can be allowed for the slow and possibly
faltering deliberations of democratic assemblies. This argument has been affirmed,
and repeated and repeated until people are mesmerized by it, and it is fundamen-
tally specious. The President has-and always had-the duty to use the armed
forces at his disposal to repel sudden armed attacks on the United States, and
there has never been a case in the whole history of the United States when the
imminence of danger to the Nation was so great that the decision to do more than
repel attacks could not be entrusted to the Congress.
Hearings on U.S. Commitments Abroad, supra note 109, at 20. Similarly, in 1971 Senator
Fulbright asserted that the alleged need for urgent and immediate action is merely a false
excuse for unilateral presidential war power. Sen. Fulbright Address, supra note 56, at
10,355. Professor Reveley described the claim that great speed is necessary in most decisions
respecting war as dubious: "[The] necessity [of speed] during the last twenty-five years has
been exaggerated." Reveley, supra note 7, at 1294. Reveley stated that since World War II,
there are only two instances in which it plausibly can be argued that the process of requiring
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Many military strategists have argued, however, that the
United States Government should be capable of not merely de-
fending an ally, but of deterring the aggressor from attacking the
ally. 19 3 Since the success of deterrence strategy depends upon the
credibility of the commitment to defend other states from aggres-
sion, 94 the President must have the power to respond to acts of
aggression with certainty and promptness. Under a "new" consti-
tutional system, the credibility of the American commitment might
be diminished because the potential aggressor would regard a de-
terrent threat that was contingent upon the President seeking and
receiving an after-the-attack statutory authorization as less credi-
ble than a deterrent threat that could be immediately and defi-
nitely executed by the President.
A threat issued under a restored constitutional system, how-
ever, could retain the same credibility as one issued under the pre-
sent system, if the President and Congress were to make use of a
statute authorizing the President to commence military operations
in the event of an attack against an American ally. This before-
the-attack resolution will have been considered by Congress before
the enemy strikes his blow, and would grant the President the
power to commence specified military operations without having to
seek additional congressional authorization. Consequently, the
President would possess the legal authority for immediate employ-
ment of American military capabilities.
Some might question whether the before-the-fact resolution is
sufficient to protect the national interest in all circumstances. 195 As
legislative authorization was too slow to protect national security. Id. Those two cases were
the Korean conflict and the Cuban missile crisis. Id. He concluded, however, that there was,
in fact, sufficient time available to the President to seek and to receive legislative authoriza-
tion in both cases. Id.
"' See J. SPANIER, supra note 73, at 124. Recognizing how deterrence pervades Ameri-
can foreign policy, two commentators have concluded:
The problem for American foreign policy has been that of "projecting" deterrence
beyond her own borders to cover other parts of the world, seeking to protect some
third party-an ally, or a neutral we wish to safeguard. Accordingly, theory about
the deterrence of limited threats to the U.S. has focused almost exclusively upon a
"three-nation problem" involving an aggressor nation, the U.S., and some smaller
nation which is the object of the aggressor's designs and which the U.S. seeks to
protect. The goal of this theory has been to discover how the U.S. can successfully
project its deterrent power to protect a third nation or group of nations.
A. GEORGE & R. SMOKE, supra note 65, at 58-59; see Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, in
THE USE oF FORCE 56-76 (1971).
191 A. GEORGE & R. SMOKE, supra note 65, at 64-65.
195 See, e.g., Wallace, The War-Making Powers: A Constitutional Flaw?, 57 CORNELL L.
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Alexander Hamilton observed: "[T]he circumstances that endanger
the safety of nations are infinite." 196 It is true that not every spe-
cific threat can be anticipated by Congress.197 Congress, however,
can determine the scope of national interest in advance of the par-
ticular threat, and can foresee the general category of threat. For
example, the United States has important economic and security
interests in the Middle East. e19  In addition, the identity of poten-
tial aggressors is known in advance of the attack."99 Thus, even
though one factor, the specific nature of the threat, may not be
known to the Congress at the time it is considering a before-the-
fact resolution, all other considerations can be foreseen and con-
templated by Congress: the nations to be protected, the identity of
the enemy, and the type of aggression.200 If, for example, Congress
determines that the United States needs to protect a large number
of Middle Eastern nations from a wide variety of enemies and
types of aggression, the Congress could pass a resolution akin to
the following:
The President of the United States is hereby authorized to
employ the armed forces of the United States for the purpose of
protecting American allies and friendly nations in the region of
REv. 719, 759 (1972). While all conceivable relevant factors cannot be foreseen by Congress,
a before-the-attack resolution can be used by the President and Congress to protect effec-
tively the national security. See infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
1" THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 23, at 200 (A. Hamilton).
9 See Wallace, supra note 195, at 759. There are some specific threats that cannot be
anticipated. For example, on July 14, 1958, Iraqi General Abdul Karim Qassim overthrew
the government of King Faisal and Prime Minister Nuri Es-Said. A. GEORGE & R. SMOKE,
supra note 65, at 347. Qassim's successful coup d'etat came as a complete surprise to the
United States. Id. While Faisal and Es-Said governed Iraq, Iraq had adopted conservative
domestic policies and a pro-United States foreign policy. See id. The Western leaders were
unable to determine the political composition of the Qassim government and many Ameri-
can policymakers feared that the Iraqi coup would jeopardize American interests in the
ongoing Lebanese civil war. See id. at 348-49; R. BARNE, supra note 75, at 144-46.
198 See Campbell, The Middle East: A House of Containment Built on Shifting Sands,
60 FOREIGN AFF. 593, 598 (1981).
' Three potential aggressors threaten the Middle East. the Soviet Union, radical na-
tions, and radical groups within conservative nations. Radical nations that threaten Ameri-
can interests include Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Iran. See MIDDLE EAST, supra note 122, at 143-
69; see also A. GEORGE & R. SMOKE, supra note 65, at 328, 332. Radical groups include the
Palestinians residing within Jordan and Lebanon. See MIDDLE EAST, supra note 122, at 31.
See generally H. OwEN & C. SCHULTE, supra note 117, at 17-23.
200 It is submitted that "aggression," although variegated, consists of finite and forsee-
able types. "Aggression" may include the following forms: conventional invasion, guerrilla
warfare, arms transfer, internal violence and instability, and nuclear attack and
intimidation.
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the Middle East from international and internal aggression from
any source.
This authorization is indeed broad. Congress, if it so desired, could
narrow the scope of the authority by identifying the friends, foes,
and type of aggression.
For example, the Congress could decide that American blood
should be shed only if the Soviet Union invaded the territory of
any nation in the Middle East, and could draft a resolution accord-
ingly.2 °1 Pursuant to this resolution, intraregional wars and inter-
nal conflicts would be excluded and therefore the President would
be without power to intervene unilaterally in these conflicts. Thus,
this resolution would empower the President to interpose Ameri-
can forces to defend Iran from a Soviet invasion, but would leave
the President without authority to intervene in an Iraq-Iran war, a
Lebanese civil war or an Arab-Israeli war. Of course, after a war
erupts in the Middle East the President is free to seek congres-
sional authorization, and if Congress authorizes war the President
can then act.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States has possessed and continues to possess sig-
nificant extraterritorial economic, political, and security interests.
Admittedly, the variety and complexity of these interests have in-
creased since World War II. A growth in overseas interests, how-
ever, does not compel the elimination of congressional participa-
tion in determining the scope of national interest and the threats
that are important enough to justify commitment of American
lives. Furthermore, the institution of Congress can move quickly
enough and is flexible enough to foresee and respond to any threat
to the national interest, and the members of Congress certainly are
able to reduce the probability of fighting an unnecessary war.
Therefore, it is urged that the practice of waging war in contraven-
201 On January 23, 1980, during a State of the Union Address, President Carter warned
that the United States would go to war, if necessary, to protect the Persian Gulf oil supply.
See MIDDLE EAST, supra note 122, at 239. Similarly, on October 1, 1981, President Reagan
announced in a news conference that the United States would not allow Saudi Arabia to
become another Iran. See id. at 245. He pledged military action if the Persian Gulf oil sup-
ply were threatened. Id. While President Carter's threat was directed solely against the So-
viet Union, President Reagan's threat was directed against radical Arab or Persian nations
or radical Arab forces within Saudi Arabia who were considering invading Saudi Arabia or
overthrowing the Saudi monarchy.
[Vol. 57:213
1983] PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 273
tion of checks and balances be abruptly halted, and the constitu-
tional procedure restored.
